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ABSTRACT
This thesis consists of three essays in nancial economics.
Chapter 1 is entitled Inside Debt.Existing theories advocate the use of cash and equity in
executive compensation. However, recent empirical studies have documented the prevalence
of debt-like instruments such as pensions. This chapter rationalizes the use of such inside
debt as an e¢ cient solution to the agency costs of debt. Owing to its greater sensitivity
to liquidation payo¤s, inside debt is more e¤ective at optimizing project selection than the
bonuses, private benets and reputational concerns advocated by prior literature. Contrary
to intuition, it is typically ine¢ cient to align the manager with rm value by granting him
equal proportions of debt and equity.
Chapter 2 is entitled Sports Sentiment and Stock Returnsand co-authored with Diego
García and Øyvind Norli. We investigate the stock market reaction to sudden changes in
investor mood. Motivated by psychological evidence of a strong link between soccer outcomes
and mood, we use international soccer results as our primary mood variable. We nd a
signicant market decline after soccer losses. For example, a loss in the World Cup elimination
stage leads to a next-day abnormal stock return of  49 basis points. This loss e¤ect is stronger
in small stocks and in more important games, and is robust to methodological changes. We
also document a loss e¤ect after international cricket, rugby, and basketball games.
Chapter 3 is entitled Leverage, Ownership Concentration, and the Tension Between Liq-
uidation and Investment.Allowing early liquidation minimizes investor losses if the manager
is unskilled. However, the possibility of liquidation deters a skilled manager from undertaking
long-term projects that risk interim turbulence. This chapter introduces a novel role of debt
that overcomes this tension. Leverage concentrates equityholdersstakes, creating incentives
for them to nd out whether short-term losses result from low ability or a temporary down-
turn in a protable project. If the rm is fundamentally sound, it is not liquidated upon poor
performance. Debt therefore allows termination without inducing myopia. Unlike models of
managerial discipline based on total payout, here dividends are not a substitute for debt as
they achieve liquidation without incentivizing monitoring.
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1 Inside Debt
1.1 Introduction
Shareholders ultimately bear the agency costs su¤ered by other stakeholders (Jensen and
Meckling (1976)). Therefore, it appears intuitive that shareholders should compensate the
manager according to rm value, rather than equity value alone. However, until recently,
empirical research documented that CEOs are remunerated exclusively with cash and equity-
like instruments, such as shares and options. Accordingly, theorists have focused on justifying
such a compensation scheme. For example, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) seek to answer
the question why are managersmonetary incentives ... traditionally correlated with the
value of equity rather than the value of debt?Important for the justication of pure equity
compensation are papers that propose cash salaries, solvency-contingent bonuses and private
benets as adequate solutions to the agency costs of debt. Therefore, existing literature has
no role for inside debt compensation.
However, recent empirical studies such as Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) and Sundaram and
Yermack (2006) have found that U.S. CEOs hold substantial inside debt in the form of dened
benet pensions. Such compensation contrasts with the predictions of existing models, and
implies the need for theories that explain why managersmonetary incentives are sometimes
correlated with the values of both debt and equity.1 Is inside debt compensation e¢ cient and,
if so, under what conditions? If it is e¢ cient, should the manager hold inside debt in the
same proportion as inside equity, so that he is aligned with rm value?
These questions are the focus of this paper. Initially taking the managers equity stake as
exogenous, I illustrate that inside debt can be more e¤ective at optimizing project selection
than the mechanisms considered in prior research. Both inside debt and existing measures pay
o¤ fully in solvency, thus encouraging the manager to avoid bankruptcy. However, creditors
are concerned not only with the probability of insolvency but also with the liquidation value
given insolvency. In a bankruptcy, pension beneciaries generally have equal priority with
other unsecured creditors, but salaries, bonuses and private benets give zero payo¤s if the
manager is red. They are thus more akin to binary options rather than debt. This advantage
of inside debt is particularly important if the managers project choice a¤ects liquidation
values, rather than just the probability of solvency. Bonuses may worsen project selection
by encouraging the manager to gamble for resurrection to try to earn his bonus, rather
than optimally liquidating the rm. Existing measures were shown to be adequate only under
specic frameworks, such as where solvency can be guaranteed (John and John (1993)), or
1Alternative explanations are that pensions reect stealth compensation, or are primarily driven by tax
considerations in which case the tax system encourages rms to adopt otherwise suboptimal pay schemes.
The aim of this paper is to show that pension compensation may be e¢ cient.
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liquidation value is always zero (Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992)).
In addition, since the optimal amount of a bonus depends on project parameter values,
a bonus solution is only implementable if such parameters are known in advance. In reality,
many investment opportunities only appear after compensation is set. Inside debt com-
pensation ensures that the manager optimally accepts (rejects) any positive (negative)-NPV
projects that arise, regardless of their specic parameter values.
Inside debt remains desirable in a more complex framework which also features an e¤ort
decision and thus an endogenous justication for equity compensation. This result extends
previous models which focus exclusively on the agency costs of debt (project selection) and
do not incorporate the agency costs of equity (e¤ort). If the managers total pay is held
constant, granting inside debt reduces his inside equity and so the optimal compensation
scheme must trade o¤ e¤ort and project selection. However, it typically does not align the
manager purely with equity (as advocated by existing research) nor purely with rm value
(as intuition might suggest). In the most common case, a debt-equity exchange reduces
e¤ort and so optimal compensation involves an equity bias, where the managers equity stake
exceeds his debt holding. However, the exchange may increase e¤ort if e¤ort has a high
expected payo¤ in bankruptcy, either because bankruptcy is likely, or because e¤ort pays o¤
primarily in liquidation states. In contrast to the agency costs of equity nomenclature,
suboptimal e¤ort may not purely result from insu¢ cient inside equity. In such cases, the
optimal compensation involves a debt bias, as found by Sundaram and Yermack (2006) in
13% of cases.
In sum, inside debt is especially benecial for highly levered rms where the agency costs of
debt are rst-order. One example is LBOs, where the private equity sponsor is e¤ectively the
manager and often holds both debt and equity. In addition, somewhat surprisingly, inside debt
is also desirable for solvent rms with low leverage at the other end of the spectrum. Since
debt is close to risk-free, the CEO may be willing to exchange salary for inside debt, leaving
his equity unchanged. Even though asset substitution is initially a second order concern, the
incentive value of the debt stake can become signicant if the rm su¤ers a downturn that
results in a sharp decline in equity value. The managers debt becomes the dominant portion
of his investment in the company, aligning him with creditors precisely when this is desirable.
Once debt has been raised, shareholders may have incentives to grant the manager addi-
tional equity, reigniting his incentives to expropriate creditors. In addition to the standard
defenses in the literature, in this paper there are additional impediments to renegotiation. It
is the ratio of the managers equity to debt share that induces creditor expropriation. There-
fore, once he has been given a sizable debt stake, shareholders may need to make such a large
extra grant of shares to restore asset substitution incentives that the cost is excessive.
Finally, I discuss whether executive pensions fulll the role of debt advocated by the
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model. In many cases, pensions are substantial and their payo¤s are su¢ ciently similar to
debt to deter creditor expropriation. One interpretation is that pensions are deliberately
used to reduce the agency costs of debt. This view is consistent with the positive correlation
between rm leverage and pension compensation (Sundaram and Yermack (2006)). A second
is that pensions are primarily tax-motivated, but have the side benet of aligning the manager
with creditors. Their presence removes the need for managers to hold actual debt, and also
suggests that the tax system does not induce rms to adopt otherwise ine¢ cient compensation
schemes. Both interpretations are consistent with the relative paucity of real-life examples
of risk-shifting. Theories of asset substitution assume that the CEO is purely equity-aligned,
but in practice managers hold substantial debt compensation which greatly reduces their
incentives to expropriate creditors. However, in some situations, pensions may not be su¢ cient
in magnitude or may pay o¤ di¤erently from debt. If pensions are junior to creditors in
bankruptcy, they are similar to a binary option. If pensions can be ring-fenced from general
creditors, they are close to risk-free and do not a¤ect incentives. In such cases, there may be
a case for supplementing pensions with actual debt securities.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 is a brief literature review. Section 1.3
illustrates where inside debt is the optimal solution to risk-shifting for a manager who is
exogenously equity-aligned. Section 1.4 endogenizes equity compensation as the result of a
shirking problem, introduces a trade-o¤ between inside debt and inside equity, and identies
the factors that determine the optimal holdings of each. Section 1.5 addresses renegotiation
concerns, Section 1.6 discusses the recent empirical evidence on pensions, and Section 1.7
concludes. The Appendix (Section 1.8) contains proofs.
1.2 Related Literature
Theorists focus on justifying cash and equity compensation likely stems from the long-
standing belief that debt compensation is not used in reality: see Murphy (1999) for a compre-
hensive survey. However, two recent papers by Bebchuk and Jackson (2005) and Sundaram
and Yermack (2006) nd that dened benet pensions are a substantial component of CEO
pay and have signicant debt-like features. Sundaram and Yermack point out the lack of a
theoretical framework to complement their empirical results: the possibility of using debt in-
struments for management compensation has received little attention ... A top priority would
appear to be the development of theory that illustrates conditions under which debt-based
compensation ... represent[s] the solution to an optimal contracting problem.This paper is
a rst step in this direction.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) were the rst to theorize the agency costs of debt. They
include a brief section wondering why inside debt (awarded in the same proportion to inside
equity) is not used as a solution, but are unable to incorporate this dimension formally into
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our analysis in a satisfactory way. They suggest that the managers salary is a su¢ cient
mechanism and thus have no role for inside debt. This paper shows that salaries are typ-
ically inadequate given their insensitivity to liquidation value. It also illustrates that their
hypothesis of rm value compensation is generally suboptimal.
John and John (1993) propose two solutions to the agency costs of debt: solvency-contingent
bonuses and reduced inside equity. Bonuses work in their model as solvency can be guaran-
teed; this paper shows that, in a more general framework, solvency-contingent bonuses are
imperfect given their binary payo¤ structure. Their model also abstracts from managerial ef-
fort and so there are no side-e¤ects associated with lowering the managers equity; in fact, zero
incentive pay and a at salary would be optimal. This paper features both e¤ort and project
selection, to provide an endogenous justication for equity compensation, and illustrates the
trade-o¤s that arise. Similarly, Brander and Poitevin (1992) do not include an e¤ort choice
and show that a bonus is only fully e¤ective if solvency can be guaranteed. Hirshleifer and
Thakor (1992) illustrate that a managers reputation (which they assume has a zero payo¤ in
bankruptcy) deters risk-shifting since they assume the liquidation value is always zero. When
the manager can a¤ect liquidation value, a binary instrument is ine¤ective.
Biais and Casamatta (1999) do consider both project selection and e¤ort, but from the
perspective of an entrepreneur raising outside nancing rather than a rm compensating a
manager. The entrepreneur continues to hold pure equity; their contribution is to show that
he will raise both outside debt and outside equity (Hellwig (1994) has a similar conclusion).
Another di¤erence is that they assume that the safe project should always be taken; in this
paper, it is not known in advance whether the risky or safe project is optimal and so the rm
must guard against excessive managerial conservatism.
Dybvig and Zender (1991) also illustrate that optimal compensation can eliminate an in-
e¢ ciency. They focus on the lemonsproblem of Myers and Majluf (1984) and their optimal
contract involves the manager committing to subscribe to future equity issues. This paper con-
siders a quite di¤erent ine¢ ciency, creditor expropriation, and the optimal contract involves
the manager holding debt. Their primary goal is to resurrect the Modigliani-Miller capital
structure and dividend irrelevance theorems; mine is to advocate inside debt in executive
compensation.
1.3 Debt and Project Selection
1.3.1 Assumptions
The model consists of four periods. At t =  1, shareholders o¤er a compensation contract
to the manager. At t = 0, risky debt is raised with face value of F and market value
D0 < F . Current total rm value is V0 = E0 + D0. All agents are risk-neutral, and the
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risk-free rate is normalized to 0. The assumption that F is exogenous is discussed in Section
1.3.4. Potential bondholders observe the managers contract when calculating D0, and so at
t =  1; shareholders select the contract that maximizes V0.
At t = 1, the manager can invest in one of two projects: R (risky) or S (safe). R has
probability pR of success,in which case the rm is worth VGR at t = 1. In failure(which
occurs with probability (1   pR)), rm value is VBR. S pays VGS with probability pS, and
VBS otherwise. I assume VGR  VGS > F , VBR < VBS < F and pR  pS. t = 1 rm value is
assumed to be observable and veriable, otherwise outside equity is problematic.2 At t = 2,
all payo¤s are realized and the debt matures.
If all of the parameters were known at t =  1, shareholders would know the optimal project
and can implement it with certainty. The compensation scheme would have a discontinuous
e¤ect: if the managers incentive compatibility constraint is (is not) satised, the optimal
project is always (never) selected. Similarly, if S (R) is optimal, there are no disadvantages
with an excessively conservative (aggressive) scheme. In reality, unforeseen projects often
appear after compensation is set, and the compensation scheme should induce the manager
to accept (reject) any positive (negative)-NPV projects that arise. I therefore assume that
VGR  U [VGS; VGRH ] : VGR is observed privately by the manager at t = 0, and never observed
by investors (unless R is selected and is successful). The optimal project is thus not known
in advance. All other parameters are publicly known at t =  1; I later discuss relaxing this
assumption.
While the core model focuses on project selection, it can easily be extended to involve
other agency costs of debt. Hence the terms asset substitutionand risk-shiftingshould
be interpreted as any value-destructive managerial action exacerbated by nancial distress.
Examples include debt overhang, concealing information, failing to disinvest, paying excessive
dividends, or tunneling resources away from the rm.
The manager holds a proportion  of the rms equity. Previous research (e.g. John and
John (1993)) takes  as exogenous; this section follows this approach and asks the question
given equity is held in reality, what is the optimal accompanying compensation scheme?
I show that, in a general framework, inside debt is typically more e¤ective than the binary
mechanisms shown by prior theories to be adequate under specic parametric conditions.
Section 1:4 endogenizes equity compensation as a means of inducing e¤ort.
1.3.2 Optimal Compensation With Standard Instruments
The endogenous components of the compensation scheme are initially stated in general terms:
the manager is paid f(V ) if rm value is V . The only restriction is that feasible contracts
must be weakly monotonic in rm value, else the manager could simply destroy rm value to
2Since project choice can be inferred from V , it does not matter whether the project is directly observable.
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increase his pay (e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p. 148)).3 Formally,
f(VGR)  f(VGS)  f(VBS)  f(VBR)  0: (1)
Optimal project selection occurs if the manager chooses S, i.e., inequality (3) is satised,
if and only if the risky project has a lower NPV, i.e., inequality (2) is satised:
pRVGR + (1  pR)VBR  pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS; (2)
i¤ pR[(VGR F )+f(VGR)]+(1 pR)f(VBR)  pS[(VGS F )+f(VGS)]+(1 pS)f(VBS): (3)
Proposition 1 First-best project selection can be implemented by
pSf(VGS) pRf(VGR)+(1 pS)f(VBS) (1 pR)f(VBR) = [F (pS pR)+(1 pS)VBS (1 pR)VBR]:
(4)
I denote any contract that satises (4) an incentive compatible contract.The optimal
contractis the cheapest feasible contract that is also incentive compatible. In this subsection,
I restrict feasible contracts to the standard instruments of equity, debt, and the solvency-
contingent bonus advocated by prior theories. If salary is junior to creditors and thus not
received in bankruptcy, as assumed by most theory papers (e.g., Innes (1990), Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994), Robe (1999)), the portion of salary in excess of the reservation wage may
function as a bonus. Calcagno and Renneboog (2006) cite a number of bankruptcy regulations
and real-life examples which suggest that salaries are sometimes senior to creditors, in which
case they do not a¤ect any incentive constraints.
It is simple to show that additional equity compensation will exacerbate risk-shifting.
Hence the contract consists of a fraction  of the rms debt and a bonus of J paid if and only
if the rm is solvent. Thus f(VGS) = f(VGR) = F +J , f(VBS) = VBS, f(VBR) = VBR and
so
 =   J(pS   pR)
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR < : (5)
A continuum of (; J) pairs satisfy the incentive compatibility condition. The optimal contract
is the cheapest incentive compatible contract.
3The same condition rules out shareholders from punishing the manager upon a low VGR realization, which
might indicate that R is chosen when it was suboptimal. Shareholders cannot punish the manager for choosing
S, since they never observe VGR if R is not selected and thus do not know whether S was suboptimal.
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Proposition 2 The optimal standard contract (; J) is given by8>>>>>>><>>>>>>>:
(; 0) if pR(1  pS)VBS > pS(1  pR)VBR;
  J(pS pR)
F (pS pR)+(1 pS)VBS (1 pR)VBR ; J

if pR(1  pS)VBS = pS(1  pR)VBR;
where J 2

0; 

F +
(1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pS   pR

;
0; 

F +
(1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pS   pR

if pR(1  pS)VBS < pS(1  pR)VBR:
(6)
If pS >> pR and VBS is close to VBR, the main advantage of S is its greater probability
of solvency. Hence the bonus should be used exclusively: its zero bankruptcy payo¤makes it
particularly sensitive to solvency. This result is consistent with John and John (1993), who
show that bonuses are a feasible solution under their assumption of pS = 1. However, if pS is
close to pR and VBS >> VBR, the main advantage of S is its greater liquidation value. Inside
debt is optimal as, unlike the bonus, its payo¤ is sensitive to liquidation value. If pS = pR,
the bonus is completely ine¤ective. Bonuses and salaries are not su¢ ciently debt-like, as they
only give incentives to achieve solvency rather than to maximize liquidation value.
While equation (5) suggests that bonuses reduce (but not eliminate) the need for inside
debt, in some cases they exacerbate asset substitution. Now assume S represents safe liqui-
dationand pays VL for certain, where VBR < VL < F .
Proposition 3 First-best liquidation can be implemented by
 = +
J
VL   pRF   (1  pR)VBR : (7)
The optimal standard contract is given by  = ; J = 0:
Owing to their binary nature, bonuses exacerbate the problem ( is increasing in J) by
giving the manager a natural inclination to gamble for resurrection by choosing R. Hence the
optimal compensation scheme only involves inside debt. This may explain why the solvency-
contingent bonuses advocated by prior literature are rarely used. In practice, bonuses are
typically positively related to shareholder value and so further increase  and thus the desired
.
1.3.3 Optimal Compensation With Non-Standard Instruments
This subsection derives the optimal compensation scheme where the only restriction is the
monotonicity condition, equation (1).
16
Proposition 4 The optimal unrestricted is contract is given by8<: f(VGR) = f(VGS) = f(VBS) =
[F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR]
1  pR ;
f(VBR) = 0:
(8)
This contract can be interpreted as a bonus payable if and only if V  VBS. Thus far, VGR
has been assumed the only stochastic parameter. However, in more general settings, many
parameters will be stochastic. The scheme in equation (8) becomes di¢ cult to implement for
two reasons. First, the optimal amount of the bonus depends on unknown parameters. This
problem is also su¤ered by the solvency-contingent bonus of Section 1:3:2, but not by inside
debt since  = . A greater problem is that the optimal threshold that triggers a bonus
payment is VBS, which may be unknown. (This contrasts with a solvency-contingent bonus
where the threshold is F , which is known). For both types of bonus, small departures in
VBS from the expected level only lead to the amount of the bonus being slightly suboptimal.
However, for the non-standard bonus, small deviations from the required threshold can induce
step-change losses in e¤ectiveness. For example, if VBS turns out even slightly lower than the
threshold in the contract, the bonus becomes insensitive to the liquidation value. In addition,
if a rm has multiple projects, VBS likely di¤ers between projects. Non-standard instruments
are thus non-robust, whereas inside debt leads to optimal decisions for all projects regardless
of their specic parameter values.
One parameter which may be known in advance is VBR. This is bounded below if the rm
owns tangible assets (such as buildings) which the manager is prevented from selling owing to
covenants, and is a minimum payo¤ for all projects. Feasible contracts can then involve the
manager holding options on the rms debt with a strike price of VBR. Let the debt options
represent a proportion  of the overall outstanding debt.
Proposition 5 The optimal contract allowing for standard instruments and debt options is
given by 8><>:
 = 0;
 = ;
J = 0:
(9)
The debt option is cheaper than straight debt because all payments are reduced by VBR.
If the manager is also being paid a salary that exceeds VBR, the debt option contract is
equivalent to issuing straight debt and reducing the managers salary by VBR. Since a debt
option is always exercised, it has the same incentive e¤ects as debt, explaining the equivalence
of  in equation (6) and  in equation (9).
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1.3.4 Alternative Mechanisms
I briey discuss whether other mechanisms can attenuate asset substitution and thus ren-
der inside debt unnecessary. Private benets, such as rm-specic human capital, prestige,
perquisites, and reputation are principally determined by the rms solvency: if the manager
is red upon bankruptcy, he can no longer derive benets from incumbency. They thus have a
very similar e¤ect to bonuses J .4 Moreover, private benets and reputation plausibly increase
with shareholder value and thus may be incorporated into , increasing the need for inside
debt.
A second mechanism is a complex bonus that pays o¤exactly like debt. This would be con-
sistent with the model, which merely requires any instrument with debt-like payo¤s. Actual
debt is a cleaner solution, as it avoids writing a complex contract just as companies award
equity directly in practice. Section 1.5 points out that a bonus may be less renegotiation-proof
than a debt security.
In the core model, the face value of debt is set at the rst-best level F FB; which is optimal
in the absence of agency costs of debt.5 These costs are foreseen by rational creditors and thus
shareholders su¤er a discount when raising debt. Alternatively, the trade-o¤ theory would
advocate lowering debt to a second-best level F SB < VBR, so that the rm is never bankrupt.
This loses some of the benets of debt, such as tax shields and reducing free cash ow. Either
way, shareholders bear the agency costs of debt; the rst manifestation is used for tractability.
Finally, covenants are an imperfect solution due to the incompleteness of contracts: see
Myers (1977). Covenants may increase asset substitution, as the manager risk-shifts even when
the rm is some distance from bankruptcy to avoid breaching the covenant. Also, covenants
may not be breached until after the key decision has been made (e.g., R was irreversibly
chosen and failed, leading to the covenant violation).6 Covenants can suboptimally restrict
managerial exibility, and thus are costly as is the case for the other solutions.
4This assumes that bankruptcy leads to termination. If the manager only has a probability q of being
retained in bankruptcy, only a proportion (1   q) of his private benets are lost and so private benets
are even less e¤ective at deterring risk-shifting. Hirshleifer and Thakor (1992) assume that the managerial
labor market can distinguish between success and failure, but not the severity of failure, and so reputation
has a binary payo¤. In reality, a managers reputation may be particularly tarnished by especially severe
bankruptcy, but the sensitivity of reputation to liquidation value is far less clear than for inside debt.
5This papers focus is on the optimal compensation scheme given that rms are partially debt-nanced. A
very rich literature illustrates the many benets of debt nancing, and therefore leverage is taken as exogenous
in this paper.
6Several studies demonstrate that executive compensation has a signicant e¤ect on risk, despite covenants.
Examples include DeFusco, Johnson and Zorn (1990), Saunders, Strock and Travlos (1990), Guay (1999), and
Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2006).
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1.4 Does Inside Debt Reduce E¤ort?
Section 1.3 followed prior literature by taking  as exogenous, and showed that inside debt is
often the optimal accompaniment to achieve e¢ cient project selection. However, a complete
analysis must provide an endogenous justication for equity compensation, else the optimal
contract would be  =  = 0. This section endogenizes  > 0 as the solution to an e¤ort
problem; the role of  > 0 is to mitigate the ensuing investment distortions. It introduces
a key trade-o¤: if the manager is granted inside debt, shareholders may reduce his equity
holding to avoid giving him rents. Consequently, e¤ort may fall. I show that inside debt
generally retains a role in optimal compensation, but the manager is no longer aligned with
rm value.
1.4.1 Assumptions
As in Section 1.3, VGR  U [VGS; VGRH ] is the only stochastic parameter. The manager chooses
e¤ort level e  [0; eH ], where eH < 1, at a personal cost of 12e
2. E¤ort has a probability e
of increasing the solvency value by g and the bankruptcy value by b, where VGS + b < F .
Intangible investment, such as sta¤ training and building customer relationships, will have
a high g and low b; the converse is true for exerting e¤ort to scrap investment projects or
liquidate assets.
I assume probabilities are una¤ected by e¤ort and that pR = pS = p. Hence successand
failurecan be thought of two states of nature, G (good) and B (bad). This assumption
substantially claries the analysis along two dimensions. First, common probabilities pR = pS
render bonuses irrelevant, allowing a clean focus on the debt-equity tradeo¤ since optimal
compensation involves only these instruments. While Section 1.3 considered the choice be-
tween debt and bonuses, this section tackles the question when debt is the preferred method
of optimizing project selection, how much debt should be held when an e¤ort decision is in-
troduced?7 Second, exogenous probabilities rule out complex feedback e¤ects between the
e¤ort and project selection decisions, and allow them to be analyzed separately. In reality,
e¤ort usually increases the probability of success. This has a very similar e¤ect to increasing
g in the analysis that follows, and thus the e¤ects of e¤ort-contingent probabilities can still
be examined within this framework.8
Shareholders solve the following problem:
7The bonus provides no incentives to exert e¤ort to increase the bankruptcy value by b. Therefore, if inside
debt is preferred for solving asset substitution, it remains superior when an e¤ort decision is introduced.
8If e¤ort increases the probability of solvency, inside debt does not directly discourage e¤ort by making B
less painful to the manager. The debt stake is worth F in G and only VBR or VBS in B , and so its value
is maximized in solvency. These payo¤s are in contrast to other compensation instruments such as severance
pay, which only pay o¤ in B and so may indeed have a disincentive e¤ect if probabilities are endogenous.
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max
;
E0(1  ) +D0(1  );
s.t. E0 + D0  U;
where U is the di¤erence between the managers reservation wage and his salary. If the
participation constraint is slack, shareholders will not choose to reduce  when  is increased,
but simply allow the manager to receive higher compensation. Since  is una¤ected, the
optimal level of inside debt can simply be derived by comparing its benets (improved project
selection and e¤ort) with its costs (increased managerial rents). This is little di¤erent from
standard models which determine the optimal equity level as the result of a trade-o¤ between
improved e¤ort and increased rents (see, e.g., Bolton and Dewatripont (2005)). In particular,
there is no trade-o¤ between  and , nor between project selection and e¤ort as increasing
 improves both. It is easy to derive a strictly positive optimal , just as the optimal  is
usually strictly positive.
I therefore assume that salary is zero and the participation constraint is always binding.
This occurs if U is so high that, with  = 0, the rm is forced to pay the manager more
equity than optimal under the e¤ort-cost trade-o¤, to satisfy his participation constraint.
Hence shareholders will choose to reduce his equity holding if the participation constraint is
relaxed by a debt award. The problem becomes:9
max
;
V0;
s.t. E0 + D0 = U: (10)
From the participation constraint,  = (): This assumption creates the sharpest possible
trade-o¤: inside debt can only be granted if inside equity is reduced, presenting the toughest
conditions under which to advocate a role for inside debt. The optimal level of inside debt is
higher if the constraint does not bind, since the side-e¤ects of debt grants are lower: the rm
can choose not only to reduce , but also reduce cash salary or give the manager rents.10 Let
 be the equity stake that satises both (10) and the equation  = .
1.4.2 The Optimal Inside Debt Level
Consider rst the managers e¤ort decision.
9Since the manager is paid a xed U , shareholders maximize V0 U . Since this is equivalent to maximizing
V0, V0 appears in the objective function.
10The analysis under a non-binding constraint is available from the author upon request. As in the core
model, both pure equity and pure rm value compensation are typically suboptimal.
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Lemma 1 The manager chooses e¤ort level
e() = p()g + (1  p)b: (11)
The marginal impact of increasing the level of inside debt  on e¤ort is given by
@e
@
= pg
@
@
+ (1  p)b; (12)
where
@
@
=
E0
h
 D0    @D0@
i
  [U   D0]@E0@
E20
< 0;
@E0
@
=   
2
(1  p)2
p
(VBS   VBR)2
VGRH   VGS + pg(1  p)b;
@D0
@
=
(1  p)2
p
(VBS   VBR)2
VGRH   VGS + (1  p)
2b2:
The literature refers to suboptimal e¤ort as the agency costs of equityand advocates
maximizing  as a solution. However, substituting debt for equity raises e¤ort if bankruptcy
is likely (p is low) and e¤ort is more productive in bad states (b > g). Hence, inconsistent with
the agency costs of equitynomenclature, shirking need not be a consequence of insu¢ cient
inside equity.
Now consider project selection. Firm value is maximized if R is selected if and only if
VGR > V

GR, where V

GR is dened by
V GR = VGS +
(1  p)
p
(VBS   VBR): (13)
However, the manager will choose R if and only if VGR > V GR(), where
V GR() = VGS +
(1  p)
()p
(VBS   VBR): (14)
If  < (>), V GR < (>)V

GR and R (S) is sometimes ine¢ ciently selected. Project selection
is optimal when  = , but if @e

@
j= > 0, there is a trade-o¤ between project selection and
e¤ort. The optimal compensation scheme thus involves an equity bias ( <  ). Conversely,
if p is low and b is high relative to g, @e

@
j= < 0 and the compensation scheme involves a
debt bias ( >  ).
Proposition 6 Optimal compensation involves an equity bias ( <  ) if @e

@
j= < 0 and
a debt bias ( >  ) if @e

@
j= > 0 . The optimal level of inside debt  is
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(i) Increasing in the productivity of e¤ort in liquidation b, and decreasing in the productivity
of e¤ort in solvency g;
(ii) Increasing in the probability of bankruptcy (1  p) and leverage F;
(iii) Decreasing in the absolute value of @
@
, the simultaneous reduction in inside equity,
(iv) Increasing in (VBS VBR), the di¤erence in liquidation values of the two projects, and
(v) Decreasing in (VGRH VGS), the range of values for VGR, the success payo¤ of the risky
project.
The intuition behind each component of Proposition 6 is as follows. If b >> g, e¤ort is
relatively productive in improving liquidation value and so debt has a more positive impact
on e¤ort. In the extreme, there is no trade-o¤ as @e

@
> 0.
If the probability of bankruptcy (1 p) rises, the benets from e¤ort are more concentrated
in B and the asset substitution issue is more severe. Both factors increase the optimal .
Bankruptcy risk also increases with leverage F even if p is unchanged. If VBR > F , the
probability of bankruptcy is zero and the asset substitution e¤ect disappears. On the other
hand, VGS < F represents the liquidation case considered by equation (7), where 
 may
exceed  in the absence of e¤ort concerns.11
@
@
= 0 if the participation constraint (10) does not bind. This occurs either if it is optimal
to give the manager rents, or his salary can be reduced by the value of the debt grant. The
latter is particularly feasible if debt is relatively safe, and so the manager values debt at close
to its expected value.12
VBS   VBR measures the extent of the asset substitution issue. VBS >> VBR occurs
if R involves intangible investment with little payo¤ in bankruptcy or the rm has limited
traditional debt capacity in the form of tangible assets. In this case it is particularly important
for the manager to be sensitive to the liquidation payo¤. Raising  could increase the rms
e¤ective debt capacity,allowing the issuance of more debt without a deterioration in terms.
Increasing  creates an extra range of VGR out-turns where S will now be optimally chosen;
reducing VGRH   VGS raises the probability of VGR falling into this extra range. As with p
falling and leverage rising, a decline in VGRH   VGS means that the asset substitution issue
becomes more important.
In sum, the previous literatures justication of primarily equity-linked incentives is war-
ranted for rms where the agency costs of debt are low and e¤ort considerations are rst-order,
such as start-ups with high growth opportunities. However, inside debt is desirable in compa-
11In the current model, the probability of bankruptcy changes in a discontinuous manner, since I have
assumed VBR, VBS and VGS are constant. In a more complex model where all parameters are variable,
bankruptcy risk would increase monotonically with F .
12The manager is risk-neutral in this model. Introducing risk aversion would provide another justication
for a trade-o¤ between inside debt and inside equity. However, if inside debt is close to risk-free, a risk-averse
manager will be willing to exchange it for salary.
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nies with a signicant risk of bankruptcy (high p); where e¤ort primarily increases liquidation
value (high b, low g); or where there is no debt-equity trade-o¤ (@
@
= 0).
LBOs often satisfy the rst two criteria. LBOs are frequently undertaken in mature
rms where the main agency problem is excessive investment. They are highly geared, but
structured so that organic cash ow and asset sales will pay down the debt in normal market
conditions. However, an unexpected economic downturn (a decline in p) may induce risk-
shifting and deter e¤ort. Indeed, the private equity rm can be considered the managerin
LBOs, given its close involvement in operations, and typically holds strips of debt and equity
to minimize conicts.
The third criterion implies that solvent companies at the opposite end of the spectrum may
also benet from inside debt. Since debt is close to risk-free, and salaries are often substantial,
inside debt may be exchangeable for salary, rather than equity. The benet of the debt grant
arises if the rms fortunes unexpectedly plummet and the value of the managers equity
sharply declines, aligning him with creditors precisely when this is desirable.13
1.5 Renegotiation
Dybvig and Zender (1991) suggest that the Myers and Majluf (1984) lemonsproblem can
be overcome by an optimal compensation contract, where the manager is either paid on the
basis of prot (rather than stock price) or commits to subscribe to new equity o¤erings.
This protects potential new shareholders from the CEO issuing overvalued equity. However,
Persons (1994) points out that current shareholders may privately renegotiate the CEOs
contract to align it with the stock price, re-igniting incentives to issue overvalued equity.
Rationally anticipating renegotiation, potential new investors will continue to discount new
equity issues, and the Myers-Majluf underinvestment result is resurrected.
In this paper, shareholders may also wish to renegotiate the managers compensation
after debt has been raised. However, renegotiation may be preventable by locking upthe
managers debt to prevent its sale (as often occurs with inside equity in practice) and imposing
restrictions on additional equity awards in the debt contract. Such contracts can be written
since the potential victimsof renegotiation are bondholders, who are an identiable party.
Contracts may be less e¤ective in the Dybvig-Zender case, since the renegotiation occurs
before the equity issue: before any new equity has been awarded to the manager which can be
locked up, and before new shareholders are in existence and can be contracted with. Similarly,
the bonuses considered in Section 1.3 are not a security that can be easily locked up: they
are a potentially renegotiable contract between shareholders and the manager.
13It is necessary to give the CEO debt at the time of a debt issue, even if the rm is healthy at the time, as
shareholders will internalize the agency costs of debt. Waiting until the rm runs into di¢ culties is suboptimal
as the shareholders will still be in control and have no incentive to align the manager with creditors.
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Contracts are not perfectly e¤ective, since shareholders may be able to increase  through
non-veriable (albeit expensive) means such as perquisites. The counter-argument specic to
this paper is the lock-up of debt, which plays multiple roles. First, it increases the cost of
renegotiation. Increasing  cannot be accompanied by a reduction in  and thus the new
shares must be given for free, which is a direct cost to shareholders. Second, it reduces the
benets of renegotiation. It is = that determines shareholder alignment, and once  > 0
has been awarded, increases in  have a muted e¤ect on =. Indeed, full congruence with
shareholders is only achieved by increasing  to 1. Third, it limits bondholderslosses from
additional equity awards. Indeed, if
(1  p)bpg > 
2
(1  p)2
p
(VBS   VBR)2
VGRH   VGS ; (15)
creditors gain from the additional equity grant owing to increased e¤ort.
The standard defenses to renegotiation in the literature also apply (see Hart (2001)).
Shareholders may have reputational concerns that deter renegotiation or su¤er from collective
choice problems.14 Even if they do coordinate to lobby the board to renegotiate, the board may
not pursue shareholdersinterests. This may either be because of shareholder-board agency
problems, or because the boards duciary duty is to all stakeholders (including creditors) as
in some US states. Supporting these arguments, Zhou (2001) nds that managerial ownership
evolves very slowly over time, which is inconsistent with opportunistic resetting.
1.6 Are Pensions Su¢ cient?
This section discusses whether the substantial executive pensions, documented by Bebchuk
and Jackson (2005) and Sundaram and Yermack (2006), can be considered inside debt. Sun-
daram and Yermack state that pension liabilities represent unsecured, unfunded debt held
by executives against the rm, and should the rm become insolvent, [CEOs] would stand
in line with other creditorsand thus can be considered equivalent to debt. This contrasts
with salary, which is zero if the manager is red upon bankruptcy. Moreover, consistent with
this model, they nd that pension compensation rises with rm leverage, and high pension
entitlements lead CEOs to manage their rms conservatively. The rst nding o¤ers some
support to the view that pensions are deliberately used to mitigate the agency costs of debt,
rather than being primarily tax-motivated.
If pensions indeed pay o¤ like debt, and are su¢ ciently large in magnitude, they already
14While collective action problems are minor for the LBOs discussed in Section 1.4, reputational concerns
are likely to be signicant. Reputational concerns for a single manager (Diamond (1989)) may be insu¢ cient
to deter risk-shifting, hence the need for a solution through compensation in the rst place. However, rep-
utational concerns are likely to be much greater for a private equity investor involved with several rms. If
she renegotiates, the debt markets will punish her when this rm and all other rms owned by her attempt
to raise debt again.
24
fulll the role of debt advocated by the model. However, there may be a case for supplementing
pensions with actual debt securities in two cases: if pensions are not su¢ cient in magnitude,
or if their payo¤ is somewhat di¤erent from debt.
First, some CEOs have modest pension entitlements, and may not be managing the compa-
nies for which low inside debt is optimal as identied by Section 1.4. Sundaram and Yermack
nd that pensions are small for young CEOs; since their study focuses on the US, it has
not yet been documented whether pensions are substantial overseas. In addition, pension
entitlements increase in a smooth manner over time, since a principal determinant is length
of service. If a rm undergoes a step-change in leverage such as an LBO, managerial co-
investment in the new debt issue may be desirable to reduce the cost of the additional debt
raised.
Second, the model illustrates that the payo¤ of a pension has to be very similar to debt
for it to be e¤ective: small departures may lead to pensions either not a¤ecting or exacer-
bating the issue. If debt is secured, pensions are junior and can be folded into J ; they may
therefore encourage risk-shifting (Proposition 3). In other cases, the payo¤ may be close to
risk-free and thus pensions do not a¤ect managerial incentives. CEOs can put pension fund
assets into a secular trust fund, ring-fenced from the reach of creditors, or a springing
trust which converts into a secular trust upon trigger events, such as a credit downgrade.15
Executives frequently have the option to withdraw their entitlements early if they forgo 10%
of the benets, in which case 90% is riskless. In addition, Key Employee Retention Programs
(KERPs) are often implemented upon bankruptcy, which can guarantee executives full
pension entitlements even if nancial creditorsclaims are only partly paid.
Finally, debt securities may potentially have a role even in companies where pensions
are currently su¢ cient to mitigate risk-shifting. Such rms may have low agency costs of
debt because they are addressing them by reducing leverage or inside equity.16 Since these
measures are costly, the importance of the agency costs of debt in practice cannot simply
be ascertained solely by looking at actual instances of risk-shifting. Debt grants may allow
leverage or equity to increase, and thus be a less costly solution.
15Examples of major companies that have adopted such trusts include Delta Airlines, Motorola, Abbott
Laboratories, TXU, Altria Group (formerly Philip Morris), Advanced Micro Devices and Owens-Illinois.
16There is a widely documented negative relationship between  and leverage (Friend and Lang (1988),
Agrawal and Nagarajan (1990), Ortiz-Molina (2004)). One interpretation is that rms for which high debt
is optimal are reducing the managers equity stake to attenuate risk-shifting (as predicted by John and John
(1993)), or rms that require high  to induce e¤ort are under-leveraging for the same reason. While Andrade
and Kaplan (1998) nd low costs of nancial distress in their sample of highly leveraged transactions, they
acknowledge that their results may be driven by sample selection: only rms with low distress costs choose
to become levered in the rst place.
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1.7 Conclusion
The simplest theory of executive compensation would advocate aligning the manager with rm
value. Since empiricists have long believed that managers are compensated exclusively with
cash and equity in practice, theorists have focused on rationalizing such a scheme. However,
recent research has shown that debt-like instruments such as pensions are in fact substantial
components of CEO compensation. These ndings suggest the need for new theories to explain
why and when inside debt may have a role in an optimal compensation, and how much debt
should be used.
This paper is a rst step in this direction. Inside debt is a more e¤ective solution to
creditor expropriation than salaries, bonuses and private benets, owing to its sensitivity to
liquidation value. Addressing the agency costs of debt by moderating leverage loses some
of the benets of debt, such as tax shields and managerial discipline; reducing inside equity
decreases e¤ort.
As with the solutions currently practiced, inside debt is not without its costs. If inside
debt must be traded o¤ with inside equity, there are potential adverse e¤ort implications.
However, the role for inside debt typically remains. In particular, in highly levered rms
where e¤ort primarily increases liquidation value, the improved project selection that results
from a debt-equity swap may be accompanied by increased e¤ort.
In many cases, pensions adequately fulll the role of inside debt advocated by the model.
However, in the rare cases where pensions are substantially insu¢ cient, there may be a case
for supplementing them with actual debt securities.
1.8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Rearranging equations (2) and (3) yields
pRVGR + (1  pR)VBR  pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS;
and
pRVGR  pSVGS  F (pR  pS)+ 1

[pSf(VGS)  pRf(VGR)+ (1  pS)f(VBS)  (1  pR)f(VBR)]:
Equating the right-hand sides of each inequality leads to equation (4).
Proof of Equation (5)
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Substitute f(VGS) = f(VGR) = F+J ; f(VBS) = VBS; f(VBR) = VBR into (4) to obtain
equation (5). To prove that the denominator is positive, set set pS = pR +p: Then
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
= (VBS   VBR)(1  pR) + p(F   VBS) > 0:
Proof of Proposition 2
To nd the cheapest contract that satises equation (5), we must rst calculate the cost
of debt and the bonus. Under rst-best project selection, R is chosen if VGR exceeds a cuto¤
V GR, where
V GR =
pSVGS + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR
pR
:
Let this occur with probability q: Hence the rm is solvent with probability
p = pRq + pS(1  q):
A bonus of J costs pJ ; debt of  costs
[pF + q(1  pR)VBR + (1  q)(1  pS)VBS]:
Hence an incentive compatible contract will cost
W = pJ+

  J(pS   pR)
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR

[pF+q(1 pR)VBR+(1 q)(1 pS)VBS];
where
@W
@J
= p  (pS   pR)[pF + q(1  pR)VBR + (1  q)(1  pS)VBS]
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR :
Since the derivative is constant, we have a corner solution. The manager is paid entirely with
debt if @W
@J
< 0, i.e.,
pR(1  pS)VBS > pS(1  pR)VBR:
Indeed, the di¤erence in cost between an all-bonus and all-inside debt scheme is given by
[pS(1  pR)VBR   pR(1  pS)VBS] 
pS   pR :
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Proof of Proposition 3
Following the same methodology as the proof of Proposition 1 leads to an incentive com-
patible contract involving
 = +
J
VL   pRF   (1  pR)VBR :
Since the bonus is both costly and increases the required , the optimal bonus is zero. Hence
J = 0 and  = .
Proof of Proposition 4
The shareholdersproblem is given by
Min qpRf(VGR) + (1  q)pSf(VGS) + q(1  pR)f(VBR) + (1  q)(1  pS)f(VBS);
s.t. pSf(VGS)  pRf(VGR) + (1  pS)f(VBS)  (1  pR)f(VBR) = Y;
where Y = [F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR]:
f(VBR) and f(VGR) should be decreased to their minimum levels of 0 and f(VGS) as this
reduces the objective function and relaxes the constraint. Let f(VGR) = f(VGS) = X: The
problem becomes
Min [qpR + (1  q)pS]X + (1  q)(1  pS)f(VBS);
s.t. (pS   pR)X + (1  pS)f(VBS) = Y:
In any incentive compatible contract,
f(VBS) =
Y   (pS   pR)X
1  pS :
There are two free parameters, f(VBS) and X. The cost of the compensation scheme is
[qpR + (1  q)pS]X + (1  q)[Y   (pS   pR)X] = (1  q)Y + pRX:
Hence the cost is minimized by having X as low as possible, i.e., as low as f(VBS): Thus
f(VBS) = X, leading to the contract in Proposition 4.
Proof of Proposition 5
Debt options are strictly preferred to debt, since they are a vertical translation and thus
cheaper while achieving the same incentive e¤ects. Hence the optimal contract comprises 
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debt options and a bonus of J . The incentive compatibility condition is
pS[(F   VBR) + J ]  pR[(F   VBR) + J ] + (1  pS)(VBS   VBR) = Y ,
and so
 =
Y   (pS   pR)J
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR :
The cost of this compensation scheme is
W = [qpR + (1  q)pS][(F   VBR) + J ] + (1  q)(1  pS)(VBS   VBR);
where
@W
@J
=
pR(1  pS)(VBS   VBR)
F (pS   pR) + (1  pS)VBS   (1  pR)VBR  0:
Hence J = 0 regardless of parameter values. This result di¤ers from Proposition 2. Debt
options pay nothing V = VBR, and so are sensitive to both liquidation value and achieving
solvency. Therefore, they dominate bonuses even if pS >> pR and the primary goal of the
compensation scheme is to be sensitive to solvency. This leads to the contract in Proposition
5.
Proof of Lemma 1
Regardless of which project is selected, the managers objective function for e¤ort is:
p()ge+ (1  p)be  1
2
e2: (16)
Di¤erentiating gives equation (11). Imposing equation (10) and di¤erentiating yields
@
@
=
E0
h
 D0    @D0@
i
  [U   D0]@E0@
E20
Equity is worth
E0() = p
VGRH + VGS +
(1 p)
p
(VBS   VBR)
2
 VGRH   VGS  
(1 p)
p
(VBS   VBR)
VGRH   VGS (17)
+pVGS  (1  p)
p
VBS   VBR
VGRH   VGS   pF + pg[pg + (1  p)b];
and debt is worth
29
D0() = [pF + (1  p)VBR]
VGRH   VGS   (1 p)p (VBS   VBR)
VGRH   VGS (18)
+[pF + (1  p)VBS] (1  p)
p
VBS   VBR
VGRH   VGS + (1  p)b[pg + (1  p)b]:
Di¤erentiating and simplifying gives the stated expressions for @E0
@
and @D0
@
.
Proof of Proposition 6
For a given , rm value is given by equation (19) below:
p(E[VGRjVGR > V GR()]) + (1  p)VBR] Pr(VGR > V GR())
+ [pVGS + (1  p)VBS] Pr(VGR < V GR()) (19)
+ pg(e()) + (1  p)b(e()): (20)
Noting that Pr(VGR > V GR()) =
VGRH V GR()
VGRH VGS and Pr(VGR < V

GR()) =
V GR() VGS
VGRH VGS , the
marginal change in rm value from increasing  eventually simplies to (21) below:
V 0() =
(1  p)2
p
(VBS   VBR)2
VGRH   VGS
  @
@

2

1  


+[pg + (1  p)b]

p
@
@
g + (1  p)b

: (21)
The rst term in (21) is the e¤ect of increasing  on project selection. It starts o¤ positive
at  = 0 and declines monotonically in , reaching 0 at  =  and turning negative as  > 
leads to excessive conservatism. The second term is the e¤ect of increasing  on e¤ort, and
its sign is ambiguous. If @e

@
j= > 0, the manager will hold more debt than equity. However,
 will be bounded as raising  >  leads to excessive conservatism. The more common case
is @e

@
j= < 0: increasing  improves project selection but reduces e¤ort. At  = , the rst
term of (21) is zero and so V 0() < 0. Since both terms in (21) are continuous and decreasing
in , V 0() is continuous and decreasing in . Thus, if V 0() > 0 at  = 0, there exists an
optimum  between 0 and  where V 0() = 0, by the Intermediate Value Theorem. Only if
V 0()  0 at  = 0 is all-equity compensation optimal.
Owing to the f(:) function, the optimal  cannot be derived in closed form. However,
since V 0() is continuous and decreasing, the optimum is greater if (21) is higher. This leads
to the comparative statics of Proposition 6.
Proof of Equation (15)
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Follows immediately from di¤erentiating equation (18) with respect to .
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2 Sports Sentiment and Stock Returns
2.1 Introduction
This paper employs a novel mood variable, international soccer results, to investigate the
e¤ect of investor sentiment on asset prices. Using a cross-section of 39 countries, we nd
that losses in soccer matches have an economically and statistically signicant negative e¤ect
on the losing countrys stock market. For example, elimination from a major international
soccer tournament is associated with a next-day return on the national stock market index
that is 38 basis points lower than average. We also document a loss e¤ect after international
cricket, rugby, and basketball games.17 On average, the e¤ect is smaller in magnitude for
these other sports than for soccer, but is still economically and statistically signicant. We
nd no evidence of a corresponding e¤ect after wins for any of the sports that we study.
Controlling for the pre-game expected outcome, we are able to reject the hypothesis that the
loss e¤ect after soccer games is driven by economic factors such as reduced productivity or lost
revenues. We also document that the e¤ect is stronger in small stocks, which other studies
nd are disproportionately held by local investors and more strongly a¤ected by sentiment.
Overall, our interpretation of the evidence is that the loss e¤ect is caused by a change in
investor mood.
Our study is part of a recent literature that investigates the asset pricing impact of be-
havioral biases documented in psychology research. This literature, which has expanded sig-
nicantly over the last decade, is comprehensively reviewed by Hirshleifer (2001) and Shiller
(2000). The strand of the literature closest to this paper investigates the e¤ect of investor
mood on asset prices. The two principal approaches in this work link returns either to a single
event or to a continuous variable that impacts mood. Examples of the event study approach
are Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000), who investigate the impact of disruption to sleep pat-
terns caused by changes to and from daylight saving, and Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2004),
who study nonsecular holidays. With respect to the continuous variable literature, Saunders
(1993) and Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) study the impact of sunshine, Cao and Wei (2005)
examine temperature, Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2003) analyze daylight, and Yuan, Zheng,
and Zhu (2006) explore lunar cycles. The main advantage of the event approach compared to
the use of a continuous variable is that the former clearly identies a sudden change in the
mood of investors, which gives a large signal-to-noise ratio in returns. The main disadvantage
of the event approach is that the number of observed signals tends to be low, which reduces
17Ashton, Gerrard, and Hudson (2003) and Boyle and Walter (2002) study the stock market e¤ect of soccer
in England and rugby in New Zealand, respectively. Ashton, Gerrard, and Hudson (2003) argue that the e¤ect
of wins and losses is symmetric. Boyle and Walter (2002) conclude, with similar point estimates to those in
this paper, that there is no evidence in favor of any e¤ect of rugby on New Zealands stock market. Both
conclusions stand in sharp contrast to our large-sample evidence.
35
statistical power.
Our main contribution is to study a variable, international soccer results, that has par-
ticularly attractive properties as a measure of mood. While extensive psychological evidence,
which we review below, shows that sports in general have a signicant e¤ect on mood, TV
viewing gures, media coverage, and merchandise sales suggest that soccer in particular is of
national interest in many of the countries we study.18 It is hard to imagine other regular
events that produce such substantial and correlated mood swings in a large proportion of a
countrys population. These characteristics provide strong a priori motivation for using game
outcomes to capture mood changes among investors. This is a key strength of our study, since
such a measure of mood changes mitigates concerns about data mining.
The large loss e¤ect that we report reinforces the ndings of Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi
(2000), who document a stock market e¤ect of similar magnitude in response to the day-
light saving clock change. While Pinegar (2002) argues that the daylight saving anomaly
is sensitive to outliers, our e¤ect remains economically and statistically signicant even after
removing outliers in the data and applying a number of robustness checks. Another con-
tribution of this paper is that we are able to go a long way towards addressing the main
disadvantage of the event approach. Our sample of soccer matches exceeds 1,100 observa-
tions, and exhibits signicant cross-sectional variation across nations. In addition, we study
more than 1,500 cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball games. The full sample of 2,600
independent observations compares favorably to existing mood-event studies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 explains the a priori motivations
for investigating the link between sports and stock returns. In Section 2.3 we describe the data,
and in particular the competitions that are the subject of our study. Section 2.4 documents
an economically and statistically signicant loss e¤ect. Section 2.5 distinguishes between
behavioral and economic explanations for this e¤ect. Section 2.6 summarizes our ndings and
concludes.
2.2 Motivation
A number of recent papers document a link between mood and stock returns. Concerns that
such results are the product of data mining call for investigating a new mood variable, or
testing an existing mood variable on an independent sample to conrm results of previous
studies. For example, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) conrm and extend the sunlight e¤ect
rst documented by Saunders (1993). Since the null hypothesis is that markets are e¢ cient,
such investigations should include a clear unidirectional alternative hypothesis, limiting the
18Several countries even require the public broadcaster to show national soccer games live and cable channels
are not permitted to bid for the rights to the games. In countries such as Italy, Spain, Greece, and Portugal,
the best-selling newspapers are dedicated exclusively to sports, particularly soccer.
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possibility of a rejection of the null in any direction. For example, Frieder and Subrahmanyam
(2004) nd abnormally positive returns around Yom Kippur and St. Patricks Day and
negative returns around Rosh Hashanah, without specifying a priori why positive returns
should arise with certain religious holidays and negative returns with others.
With the above in mind, we argue that a mood variable must satisfy three key character-
istics to rationalize studying its link with stock returns. First, the given variable must drive
mood in a substantial and unambiguous way, so that its e¤ect is powerful enough to show
up in asset prices. Second, the variable must impact the mood of a large proportion of the
population, so that it is likely to a¤ect enough investors. Third, the e¤ect must be correlated
across the majority of individuals within a country.
We believe that international soccer results satisfy these three criteria. An abundance of
psychological evidence shows that sports results in general have a signicant e¤ect on mood.
For example, Wann et al. (1994) document that fans often experience a strong positive
reaction when their team performs well and a corresponding negative reaction when the team
performs poorly. More importantly, such reactions extend to increased or decreased self-
esteem and to positive or negative feelings about life in general. Hirt et al. (1992) nd that
Indiana University college students estimate their own performance to be signicantly better
after watching a win by their college basketball team than after watching a loss. Schwarz et
al. (1987) document that the outcome of two games played by Germany in the 1982 World
Cup signicantly changed subjectsassessments of their own well-being and their views on
national issues. A related study by Schweitzer et al. (1992) shows that assessments of both
the probability of a 1990 war in Iraq and its potential casualties were signicantly lower among
students rooting for the winning team of a televised American football game than among fans
of the losing team. Changes in mood also a¤ect economic behavior. Arkes, Herren, and Isen
(1988) nd that sales of Ohio State lottery tickets increase in the days after a victory by the
Ohio State University football team. Given the evidence that sports results a¤ect subjects
optimism or pessimism about not just their own abilities, but life in general, we hypothesize
that they impact investorsviews on future stock prices.19
Note that as a testament to the fundamental importance of sports, the e¤ects of sports
results extend far beyond simple mood changes. For instance, in many cases sport results
have such a strong e¤ect that they adversely a¤ect health. Carroll et al. (2002) show that
admissions for heart attacks increased 25% during the three-day period starting June 30,
1998, the day England lost to Argentina in a World Cup penalty shoot-out.20 Further, White
(1989) documents that elimination from the U.S. National Football League playo¤s leads to
a signicant increase in homicides in the relevant cities following the games, and Wann et
19For other related studies see Sloan (1979), Wann and Branscombe (1995), Platow et al. (1999), and
Bizman and Yinon (2002).
20See Berthier and Boulay (2003) and Chi and Kloner (2003) for more recent studies with similar conclusions.
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al. (2001) list several cases of riots after disappointing sports results, citing a multitude of
other papers on the same issue. Trovato (1998) also nds that suicides among Canadians rise
signicantly if the Montreal Canadiens are eliminated early from the Stanley Cup playo¤s.
While a large body of the literature shows that sporting events in general impact human
behavior, a signicant amount of evidence suggests that soccer in particular is an important
part of many peoples lives. For example, the cumulative number of television viewers that
followed the 2002 World Cup in Korea/Japan exceeded 25 billion, the nal between Brazil
and Germany was viewed by more than 1 billion, and on average more than 20 (10) million
viewers from Italy (Spain and England) watch their national team in the nal stages of the
World Cup or European Championship.21 Moreover, national soccer results inuence the
mood of an entire country in a similar way, whereas other popular sports, such as American
football and baseball, are predominantly contested on a club rather than country level. The
home biasdocumented by French and Poterba (1991) means that the individuals a¤ected
are also likely to be the marginal investors in the domestic stock market. 22Thus, international
soccer matches are among the very few events that take place at regular intervals and that are
perceived as important by a large fraction of the population in a broad range of countries, and
as such are interesting to study. Accordingly, soccer serve as our primary sport for analysis.
To increase our sample size, we also investigate the impact of cricket, rugby, ice hockey,
and basketball results. These sports also involve regular international competition and are
important in a number of countries. However, we expect any results to be strongest in
relation to soccer, given it is the number one sport in most of the countries we study, often
by a substantial margin.
The psychology literature documents a signicant di¤erence in the behavior of fans fol-
lowing wins and losses. Specically, while an increase in heart attacks, crimes, and suicides is
shown to accompany sporting losses, there is no evidence of improvements in mood of a sim-
ilar magnitude after wins. This asymmetry suggests that we should observe a greater e¤ect
after soccer losses than after soccer wins. 23A similar prediction follows from the prospect
theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). At the heart of prospect theory is its reliance on
gains and losses as carriers of utility, rather than wealth levels. That is, the reference point
21These gures are substantially greater than those for other sports. We obtained TV viewership data for
England using news searches in factiva.com and google.com (extensive viewing gures are unavailable for
other countries). These viewership gures show that all the top 30 sport events in England in 2000 were
associated with soccer, with the exception of the Grand National (horse racing).
22French and Poterba (1991) nd that the domestic ownership shares of the worlds ve largest stock markets
lie between 79% and 96%. This is conrmed by a multitude of further studies, summarized by Karolyi and
Stulz (2003).
23The psychology literature also hints at the possibility of win e¤ects being larger than loss e¤ects. According
to behavioral patterns known as basking in reected glory (BIRGing) and cutting o¤ reected failure
(CORFing), fans cut their association with losing teams and increase their association with winning teams.
See, for example, the discussion in Hirt et al. (1992).
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against which gains and losses are measured becomes an important determinant of utility.
The natural reference point in our setting is that of supporterspre-game expectations of how
their team will perform. A number of studies show that fans are subject to an allegiance
bias,whereby individuals who are psychologically invested in a desired outcome generate
biased predictions (see Markman and Hirt (2002), Wann et al. (2001)). Thus, if the reference
point of soccer fans is that their team will win, we may nd a greater stock price reaction
after losses than after wins. A third reason to expect an asymmetric reaction to wins and
losses, specic to elimination games, results from the inherent asymmetry of the competition
format. While a win merely advances a country to the next stage, a loss immediately removes
the country from the competition.
2.3 The Data
We collect international soccer results from January 1973 through December 2004 from the
website www.rdasilva.demon.co.uk. The data include games from the World Cup and the
main continental cups (European Championship, Copa America, and Asian Cup).
International soccer competitions have used slightly di¤erent formats throughout the last
30 years. With respect to the World Cup, as of 2004, national teams from di¤erent geographic
regions play against each other to qualify for the Cup. We refer to games at this stage as
qualifying games. Based on performance in the qualifying rounds, 32 teams are selected
as competitors for the World Cup. The teams are divided into groups of four. We refer
to games in this stage as group games. Teams in each group play against each other
with the top two advancing to the elimination stage. In this stage, which starts with 16
teams, no ties are allowed. Thus, at each of the following stages, half of the remaining teams
are eliminated. The team that survives all elimination matches wins the World Cup. The
European Championship, Copa America, and Asian Cup follow a similar format to determine
the winner.
The international soccer sample comprises matches played by 39 di¤erent countries (see
the Appendix for country selection and Table IX for details). We classify a total of 1,162
soccer matches, 638 wins and 524 losses, as relevant mood events.This set of mood events
includes all elimination and group games in the World Cup and the continental cups, that is
756 games, plus another 406 relevant qualifying games. Owing to the large disparity in skill
across participating countries in a typical qualifying group, a national team will usually play
only four to six matches that will be critical for its qualication and that in turn will have a
signicant mood impact. 24To select games that have a reasonable chance of being important,
24Strong soccer nations such as England, Italy, and Spain may play in the same groups as substantially
weaker nations such as Malta, San Marino, and Luxembourg. Games against weak opposition are less likely
to generate any interest, and are therefore less interesting as mood events.
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we use closeness in the ability of the two opponents as a proxy for importance, where ability is
measured using Elo ratings (www.eloratings.net). 25A qualifying game is dened as close if
the Elo rating of the two opponents is within 125 points (after adding 100 points to the team
with the home advantage) or if the game is played as part of the knock-out stage between the
qualifying rounds and the group stage. As of October 31, 2005, the di¤erence in Elo ratings
between the top-ranked country (Brazil) and the 10th country (Portugal) is 122 points.
We collect the data on cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball from various web sources.
The cricket matches come from One Day Internationals played over the period 1975 to 2004,
the rugby matches from the Six Nations (England, France, Ireland, Italy, Scotland, and
Wales), Tri Nations (Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa), and World Cup competitions
between 1973 and 2004, the ice hockey matches from theWorld Championships (1998 to 2004),
Olympics (1980 to 2002), and World Cup/Canada Cup (1996 and 2004), and the basketball
matches from the Olympics (1992 to 2004) and World Championships (1994 to 2002). The
Appendix describes data sources and the details of the sample selection for all sports. The
sample of cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball matches contains 905 wins and 645 losses
for 24 countries. This gives on average 388 games for each of these four sports. However,
about 45% of the other-sport sample consists of rugby games, due to both longer time series
of stock returns for rugby nations and the greater regularity of rugby games.
The market indices used in this study are from Datastream. We compute returns using a
total return index (assuming that dividends are reinvested). If the total return index is not
available, we use a price index instead. Index returns are measured in the local currency since
the biases we have in mind are associated with domestic investors, for which local returns are
the relevant benchmark. The Appendix reports the details on the indices used in this study.
2.4 Results
To measure the e¤ect of international sports results on stock prices, we use the return on a
broad stock market index on the rst trading day following the game. While for some weekday
games the market is open while the match is being played, we choose to use the rst trading
day after the match for all games to ensure that we have the return for a full day when the
game outcome is known. If anything, this potential asynchrony attenuates our results since
part of the reaction may have been incorporated in prices before our measurement day.
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table I provides information about the number of games included in the sample for each sport,
as well as mean daily log stock market returns on days following game days and non-game
25Elo ratings, developed by Arpad Elo, are best known as the rating system used in chess to rank players.
These ratings have started to become popular for paired comparisons in other sports.
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days. For the sample of soccer countries in Panel A, 181,796 trading days are not associated
with a soccer match. The average return and standard deviation for these days are 5.8 and
144.9 basis points, respectively. The average return on days after an international soccer win
is positive (5.0 basis points), but negative and signicantly lower on days following a loss
( 18.4 basis points). The standard deviation of returns is slightly higher after game days
than for other days, but the di¤erence is only minor. Looking across the di¤erent cups and
stages in the competition, it is apparent that the loss e¤ect is most pronounced for World Cup
games and elimination games in general. A similar win-loss pattern shows up in the returns
after other sports results in Panel B of Table I. For the 645 loss days, the average return is
 15.3 basis points. The loss e¤ect seems to be more pronounced for cricket and basketball,
with the cricket point estimates consistent with the sports importance in South Asia. The
average return on the 903 win days is  4.0 basis points, with positive point estimates only
for the ice hockey and basketball subsamples.
In Panels A and B, we have a total of 10 independent subsamples of games. It is reasonable
to assume that the stock returns associated with a game will be independent across these
groups. In Panel A, the di¤erence between average returns after win days and loss days is
always positive, with a maximum of over 50 basis points for World Cup elimination games. In
Panel B the di¤erences are positive with the exception of the rugby subsample, for which the
di¤erence is negative, but by less than one basis point. Therefore, in nine of the 10 subgroups
the point estimates show a positive di¤erence between win and loss days. The probability
that there are nine or more successes out of 10 equally likely Bernoulli trials is 1%. Thus, the
null hypothesis of a similar return after wins and losses can be easily rejected at conventional
levels of statistical signicance. In sum, even ignoring the actual size of the di¤erences, the
evidence in Table I suggests that sports results are indeed correlated with stock returns.
An important property of the soccer events we study is that they are clustered around a few
weeks, mostly in the months of June and July for the World Cup, European Championship,
and Copa America. For example, even though we have 177 distinct elimination games with
wins and 138 with losses, there are only 113 distinct days in our database for which at least
one country won and only 96 days for which at least one country lost. To the extent there
are common shocks to stock returns across di¤erent countries, return observations on event
dates will not be independent. Moreover, for all the sports, because many matches are played
between Friday afternoon and Sunday afternoon, we measure the daily return on Monday for
all these games. This may introduce a spurious day-of-the-week relationship between soccer
results and stock returns. The next section details the econometric approach we follow to
deal with these and other issues that may inuence our results.
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2.4.2 Econometric Approach
Our null hypothesis is that stock markets are una¤ected by the outcomes of soccer matches.
This null hypothesis embeds the view that investors are rational, that markets are e¢ cient,
and that the economic benets associated with winning an international soccer game are
too small to inuence the national stock market index. The alternative hypothesis is that
wins lead to a positive stock market reaction and losses lead to a negative reaction. This
is motivated by the ndings from the psychology literature that suggest wins are associated
with a good mood and losses with a bad mood.
Under the null hypothesis, soccer outcomes are uncorrelated with asset prices. This in
turn implies that the e¤ects of soccer should be consistently estimated with any model of
stock returns even one that is completely misspecied. 26To estimate the impact of wins
and losses on stock returns while controlling for the Monday e¤ect and other confounding
e¤ects, we rst estimate the following model for each country i:
Rit = 0i + 1iRit 1 + 2iRmt 1 + 3iRmt + 4iRmt+1 + 5iDt + 6iQt + it; (22)
where Rit is the continuously compounded daily local currency return on a broadly based
stock market index for country i on day t, Rmt is the continuously compounded daily U.S.
dollar return on Datastreams world market index on day t, Dt = fD1t; D2t; D3t; D4tg are
dummy variables for Monday through Thursday, andQt = fQ1t; Q2t; Q3t; Q4t; Q5tg are dummy
variables for days for which the previous one through ve days are non-weekend holidays.
The model specication in (1) is motivated by previous studies of the time-series variability
of stock returns. The lagged index return, Rit 1, is included to account for rst-order serial
correlation. To the extent that international stock markets are integrated, the return on
local indices will be correlated across countries. The contemporaneous return on the world
market portfolio, Rmt, is included to control for this correlation. Since some local markets
may be lagging the world index while other may be leading the index, the model also includes
Rmt 1 and Rmt+1. We estimate the model simultaneously for all countries by interacting each
independent variable with a set of country dummies. For the sample of 39 soccer nations, the
adjusted-R2 for this regression is 15%.
Let ^it denote the residuals from regression (1). We estimate the e¤ect of the outcome of
international soccer matches using the regression model
^it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit; (23)
where Wit = fW1it;W2it; : : : g are dummy variables for wins in di¤erent game subgroups and
26This follows from the fact that omitted variables do not bias coe¢ cient estimates in a regression when
the omitted variable is independent of other regressors.
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Lit = fL1it; L2it; : : : g are loss dummies for the same set of game subgroups. The number
of game subgroups will vary depending on the setting. More specically, Wgit is a dummy
variable that equals one if country i wins a soccer match in game subgroup g (e.g., a World
Cup elimination game) on a day that makes t the rst trading day after the match and zero
otherwise; Lgit, a dummy variable for losses, is dened analogously to the win dummy. As in
Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003), we estimate the above model using panel-corrected standard
errors (PCSE), which assumes that the error terms uit are mean zero and uncorrelated over
time, but allows for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation across countries.
One possible concern regarding the above statistical specication is its constant-volatility
assumption. French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987) and Bollerslev, Engle, and Nelson
(1994), among others, show that stock index returns have time-varying volatility. Thus, if any
of our international competitions occurred during periods of high volatility, the magnitude of
our standard errors would be biased downward. To address this issue we model stock return
volatility using a GARCH model as developed by Engle (1982) and generalized by Bollerslev
(1986). Specically, after modelling stock returns using equation (1), we model the volatility
of the error term from this regression as the GARCH(1,1) process 2it = 0i+1i
2
it 1+2i
2
it 1,
where 2it is the index return volatility for country i on day t. We then use the time series ^
2
it
to form the new time series of normalized stock index returns R0it = ai + bi(1=^it)Rit, where
ai and bi are chosen so that the mean of R0it is equal to zero and the standard deviation is
equal to one. By normalizing all index returns we eliminate the heterogeneity in volatility
across countries in addition to the time-series variation adjustment of the GARCH model.
The normalized returns, R0it, are then used in the model specication (1), from which we
obtain a second set of normalized residuals, which we denote by ~it. For the most part, we
conduct our analysis on the normalized residuals ~it. To distinguish these residuals from the
residuals ^it, we refer to the latter as abnormal raw returnsand the former as abnormal
normalized returns.
2.4.3 The Loss E¤ect
Table II reports the main ndings of this paper. Panel A details results using abnormal raw
returns for matches played in the eight World Cups and all continental cups between 1974
and 2004. Focusing rst on the results for losses on the right-hand side of Panel A, the most
striking nding is that national stock markets earn a statistically and economically signicant
negative return on the day after a loss by the national soccer team. The ordinary least squares
(OLS) coe¢ cient on the loss dummy is  38.4 basis points for the 138 elimination games, and
a staggering  49.4 basis points for the 56 World Cup elimination games. The point estimates
are consistently negative for all six subsets of games.
The point estimate for the loss e¤ect is increasing in game importance. First, the World
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Cup games show a bigger loss e¤ect than the continental cup games for all three game groups.
Second, the loss e¤ect for elimination games is larger than for group games, which in turn show
a larger loss e¤ect than close qualifying games. It seems natural to argue that elimination
games in the nal stages of a soccer competition should have the strongest mood e¤ect, as
such games receive the greatest media coverage and a loss in an elimination game immediately
sends a national team home. Moreover, some losses in group or qualifying games may be
irrelevant (because a team already qualied or no longer has a chance of qualication due to
performance in earlier group games) or may not yield immediate elimination (since a team
can recover by winning subsequent group games).
For the full sample of 524 soccer losses, the point estimate is  21.2 basis points, highly
signicant both in economic and statistical terms. We reject the null hypothesis of L = 0 at
any conventional level using panel-corrected standard errors. The win coe¢ cient is a positive
1.6 basis points for the overall sample and a positive 9.0 basis points for World Cup elimination
games. However, these estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero. The large
negative e¤ect for losses and smaller positive e¤ect for wins is consistent with the inherent
asymmetry between elimination wins and losses. While a loss leads to instant exit, a win
merely advances the team to the next round. Thus, the attention of fans after a win may
quickly turn to the next stage of matches. This may be exacerbated by an allegiance bias
in fansexpectations regarding the game outcome. If fans overestimate the probability of a
national team win, losses will have a particularly dramatic e¤ect.
Panel B in Table II reports the results using the abnormal normalized returns described
in Section 2.4.2. Since the estimates on these normalized returns give less weight to ob-
servations in countries with volatile stock markets, game-day observations that come from
extreme returns in highly volatile markets will have a smaller impact on the point estimate.
The results on the right-hand side of Panel B conrm the ndings from Panel A. The loss
e¤ect is una¤ected by the GARCH(1,1) volatility adjustment; if anything, the GARCH ad-
justment and the normalization of returns increase the statistical power to reject the null
hypothesis. In order to interpret the size of the coe¢ cient estimates, and thereby measure
economic signicance, notice that L =  0:157 for all games implies an average return that
is 0:157 standard deviations below its mean. For a stock market index with daily volatility
of 1.449 basis points (see Panel A Table I), this translates into an abnormal raw return of
0:1571:449 = 0:23, which is almost identical to the point estimate for raw abnormal returns
from Panel A. Turning to the left-hand side of Panel B, the results from Panel A are again
conrmed. There is no evidence of any abnormal stock market returns after wins. The win
coe¢ cients are virtually zero for all game subsets and are statistically indistinguishable from
zero.27
27We also nd moderate evidence that the market bounces back after the initial drop. The point estimate
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When comparing across competitions and stages in Panel A of Table II, it appears that
the loss e¤ect is increasing in game importance. In Table III we explore this issue further
by investigating whether the e¤ect is stronger in countries in which soccer is of greatest
importance. We split the sample into Top Seven soccer nationsand Other soccer nations.
The Top Seven soccer nations are: Argentina, Brazil, England, France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain.28 The remaining 32 countries are referred to as Other soccer nations. Panel A of
Table III contains the results for the Top Seven countries while Panel B contains results for
the Other countries. Comparing corresponding point estimates in the two panels, the point
estimates for the Top Seven are larger in magnitude for all wins and all losses except for
continental group games. However, an economically and statistically signicant loss e¤ect
still exists for Other countries, so the e¤ect documented in Table II is not driven purely by
the Top Seven. The strength of the e¤ect in Other countries, coupled with the high standard
errors, prevents us from statistically rejecting the hypothesis that all point estimates in Panel
A are equal to the corresponding point estimates in Panel B. 29
2.4.4 Statistical Robustness Checks
This section investigates the robustness of the loss e¤ect by controlling for the clustering of
games on certain dates and by eliminating the e¤ect of outliers in the data. For brevity we
report results only on normalized returns the results using raw returns are virtually identical.
A potentially important problem with our data is the time-clustering of observations. Al-
though equation (1) controls for market movements, we may be overstating the statistical
signicance of our estimates if the model does not fully capture the correlations among dif-
ferent countriesreturns on a given date. For example, shocks to emerging markets are likely
to be inadequately captured by the Datastream world index, which is mostly composed of
returns from developed nations. To mitigate the problems created by time-clustering, we
form portfoliosof winners and losers for each game date. For each date t for which either
Wit = 1 or Lit = 1 for some i, we average ~it over all countries with Wit = 1, and average ~it
over all countries with Lit = 1. This yields two time series of abnormal normalized portfolio
returns, w^Lt and w^Wt, for losing countries and winning countries, respectively. Under our null
hypothesis, these time series should both have zero means.
for the second trading day after the game is 7.2 basis points for all soccer losses (controlling for rst-order
autocorrelation) and is statistically signicant at close to 5% using a one-sided test. The point estimate is 5.6
basis points for elimination games and not statistically signicant. These results are not reported for brevity
but are available from the authors upon request.
28The professional soccer leagues of England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain collectively account for
80% of soccer revenues in Europe, which in turn is by far the most dominant continent for global soccer
income. These countries are known throughout the industry as the Big Five.Together with Argentina and
Brazil, these seven countries systematically occupy the top world rankings.
29This test is not reported in a table but is available from the authors upon request.
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Panel A of Table IV presents the number of win days and loss days, the average returns on
the win and loss portfolios, and standard t-values for a test of zero mean. Consistent with all
our earlier ndings, there is a statistically signicant loss e¤ect as well as a negligible e¤ect for
wins. The point estimates are very similar to those in Panel B of Table II, aside from a small
decrease in the statistical signicance of the tests since we are dropping all cross-sectional
information on a given day. However, the loss e¤ect remains statistically signicant at levels
close to 5% or better for all nal-stage game subsets (both elimination and group games).
The results for the full sample of 524 losses, which is reduced to 358 date observations, remain
highly signicant, with a point estimate of  14.9 basis points and a t-statistic of  3.3.
We also investigate the sensitivity of our result to outliers. This test is motivated by
Pinegar (2002), who shows that the clock change results of Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi (2000)
are sensitive to outliers in their data. We dene outliers as observations for which the dummy
variables Wit or Lit equal one and the absolute value of the abnormal normalized returns,
~it, is large. In other words, we identify observations with large negative or large positive
returns on a win day or a loss day. E¤ectively, this approach identies the observations that
have the greatest inuence on the estimates of W and L.
Panel B in Table IV reports trimmed means, where 20% of the game-day observations are
removed (10% extreme negative observations and 10% extreme positive observations). The
t-statistics reported are calculated using standard asymptotic approximations for trimmed
means (see Huber (1996), chapter 3). Again, we nd that the loss e¤ect documented in
Table II is remarkably robust. After trimming the data, the point estimate after losses in
international soccer matches is  12.6 basis points with a t-statistic of  3.50. The trimmed
means for losses are slightly less negative than the untrimmed means, revealing that negative
outliers tend to be somewhat larger in absolute value than positive outliers, especially for
the qualifying games subset. However, both the economic and statistical signicance of the
results remain strong. Consistent with our previous analysis, these robust estimates fail to
uncover any positive e¤ect after wins.
2.4.5 Evidence from Other Sports
Panel B of Table II shows that the loss e¤ect is statistically signicant in all three mutually
exclusive groups of the 524 soccer losses games (elimination, group, and close qualiers).
However, from Panel A of Table II, it is clear that the loss e¤ect is strongest in the subsamples
of 138 elimination games and 81 World Cup group games. To increase our sample of sports-
related mood events, we investigate whether the loss e¤ect documented for soccer exists in
other international sports. To ensure that each sport is important in a reasonable number of
countries, the sports we study are cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and basketball. The Appendix
details country selection for each sport.
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Since soccer is the main sport for the vast majority of the 39 countries we dene as soccer
nations, we expect that other sports will exhibit a weaker e¤ect. A possible exception may
be cricket, as this is the main sport for around half (India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and possibly
South Africa) of the seven countries included as cricket nations. For example, approximately
75% of the sports-related advertising revenues in India are generated through cricket events,
and the Indian government considered moving the 2004 elections to avoid a conict with
a cricket series against Pakistan, fearing a sporting defeat would severely impact electorate
mood.
Table V reproduces the analysis in Tables II and IV for our sample of other sports. Some-
what surprisingly, given the lesser importance of these sports, Panel A of Table V shows a
similar pattern to that reported for the soccer sample. In particular, the point estimate after
losses in these other competitions is negative,  8.4 basis points, and statistically signicant at
conventional levels. The e¤ect is negative for all subsamples but ice hockey, and is particularly
large for cricket and basketball. As for soccer, there is no signicant e¤ect after wins in the
overall sample. Although smaller in magnitude compared to the soccer point estimates from
Table II (consistent with the other sports being a weaker mood variable), the data support the
hypothesis that these other sporting events are also associated with stock market movements.
The last two panels of Table V perform robustness checks along the lines of those in
Section 2.4.4. The point estimate for the full sample of games is virtually unchanged by
either pooling the cross-sectional returns over dates (Panel B) or computing trimmed means
(Panel C). The t-statistic drops to  1.88 for the portfolio approach and increases to  2.53
for trimmed means. The cricket subsample is the most robust of the four, showing even larger
point estimates and stronger statistical signicance using either portfolio returns or trimmed
means, partly because the trimming removes an extreme positive outlier for India after a
cricket loss.30 This nding is consistent with the fact that cricket is the number one sport,
and therefore a strong mood proxy, in half of the seven countries included as cricket nations.
The evidence is marginal for the rugby and basketball subsamples, and only the ice hockey
games do not seem to have point estimates consistent with our previous analysis. Again, this
could be related to the fact that these sports are second in importance when compared to
soccer, implying that a smaller proportion of the population is inuenced by game outcomes.
To sum up, the results reported in Tables II through V show a striking loss e¤ect. Stock
markets exhibit a statistically and economically signicant negative return on days after a
loss by the national team in a sport the country views as important. The e¤ect is especially
strong after international soccer losses but is also signicant after losses in other sports. The
30On March 3, 1992, the stock market index for India rose 29%. This can be attributed to a market
deregulation that authorized foreign institutional investors to make investments in all securities traded on the
primary and secondary markets. The Indian cricket team experienced a loss on March 1; since March 2 is
coded as a holiday for India, March 3 is the rst trading day after the cricket game.
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following section investigates competing interpretations of the loss e¤ect.
2.5 Soccer, Mood, and Economics
Our study is motivated by the behavioral alternative hypothesis that soccer results a¤ect
stock returns through their impact on investor mood. However, the loss e¤ect may be a
result of e¢ cient markets rationally reacting to the negative economic consequences of losing
a game. This includes direct economic e¤ects such as lower sales of related merchandise
and advertising, the negative impact on productivity, and a potential reduction in consumer
expenditure resulting from mood changes. The main goal of this section is to distinguish
between these competing explanations for the loss e¤ect. One simple argument that casts
doubt on a pure economic explanation is the sheer size of the e¤ect. To put the results in
perspective, 40 basis points of the U.K. market capitalization as of November 2005 is $11.5
billion. This is approximately three times the total market value of all the soccer clubs
belonging to the English Premier League.
We further investigate the competing explanations for the loss e¤ect in three ways. First,
rational asset pricing suggests that market declines should be particularly strong for losses
that are unexpected under objective probabilities. To test this implication we add data on
the ex ante probability of a win in a particular game. Second, we study whether the e¤ect
is stronger in small versus large stocks since the former are held more by local investors and
their valuations are more likely to be a¤ected by sentiment. Third, we study trading volume
around our event dates to rule out potential stock market liquidity e¤ects.
2.5.1 The Loss E¤ect and Expected Game Outcome
Even if the negative e¤ect of a soccer loss is due to irrationality, investors could still be
perfectly rational when pricing nancial assets. In particular, market e¢ ciency predicts that
investors should price in the expected economic impact of soccer results before the game.
Therefore, the loss e¤ect should be stronger for losses that are more unexpected. To test this
conjecture, let VWit denote the value of the stock market in country i at time t following a
soccer win, and let VLit denote the corresponding value after a loss. A negative economic
e¤ect of soccer losses suggests that VWit > VLit.
If investors have assigned a probability pit to a national team win, the economic e¤ect
priced into the index level of the national stock market will be pitVWit + (1  pit)VLit. Let Iit
be the index level that includes the expected soccer e¤ect. After controlling for other factors
that move the national index, the soccer-related realized return on the index is
it =
(VWit   VLit)
Iit
Wit   (VWit   VLit)
Iit
pit + vit; (24)
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where Wit is a dummy variable that equals one (zero) if country i wins (loses) a soccer match
on a day that makes t the rst post-game trading day, and vit is a mean zero error term.
We can generate testable predictions of a rational story as follows. Since the index level
Iit is large relative to the soccer e¤ect, @Iit=@pit is approximately zero. This implies that
@it=@pit is approximately equal to  (VWit   VLit)=Iit. Thus, if we study returns on game
dates only, the soccer-related realized return can be written as a cross-sectional regression:
it = 0 + 1Wit + 2pit + vit: (25)
Comparing equation (4) to equation (3), the above economic arguments imply the following
three restrictions on the parameters: 0 = 0, 1 > 0, and 1 =  2.
While the above arguments clearly predict a more negative impact of an unexpected loss
(i.e., 2 < 0), there are no unambiguous predictions under the behavioral explanation. First,
as we discuss in Section 2.2, the allegiance bias suggests that agentsbeliefs may not be closely
related to expectations computed under objective probabilities. That is, under an allegiance
bias, losses are nearly always unexpected. For example, 86% of fans surveyed thought that
England would beat Brazil in the 2002 World Cup quarter nal, even though Brazil was the
worlds top-ranked team; this contrasts with the 42% probability that bookmakers assigned
to a victory (Brazil eventually won the competition). Second, even if data on subjective
probabilities were available, it is not clear that we would expect a negative coe¢ cient on the
subjective probability in equation (4). On the one hand, losses to strong opponents may be
less painful as they are less unexpected. On the other hand, formidable opponents tend to be
historic rivals and so a loss against them (e.g., England losing to Germany or Spain to Italy)
may be as emotionally painful as an embarrassingloss to weak opposition.
We test the restrictions on the coe¢ cients of equation (4) using probabilities derived from
Elo ratings. Let EH and EA be the Elo rating for the home teamand the away team,
respectively. The probability that the home team wins is31
P(Home-team wins) =
1
10 (EH+100 EA)=400 + 1
: (26)
The probabilities implied by the Elo ratings have a correlation of 0:929 with betting odds data
that we obtain for slightly less than 60% of the overall sample. Evidence surveyed in Hausch
and Ziemba (1995) shows that odds data coincide closely with objective probabilities, implying
that our Elo-based ex ante probabilities should proxy well for expected game outcomes.
31For the games for which there is no home team (i.e., most nal-stage games), we use
P(Team H wins) =
1
10 (EH EA)=400 + 1
:
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The estimation of equation (4) is conducted in two stages. First, we estimate ~it as
described in Section 2.4.2. Second, the game date residuals from the rst-stage regression are
used as the dependent variable in the cross-sectional regression in equation (4).
Panel A of Table VI reports the results from the estimation of equation (4) without any
restrictions on the coe¢ cients. To ensure that point estimates in Panel A are comparable to
our earlier ndings, we normalize pit to have zero mean. Thus, since Wit is zero on loss days,
the intercept picks up the loss e¤ect controlling for the ex ante probability that country i will
win the match. Focusing rst on the sample of all games, the intercept is negative, close to
the point estimate for losses from Table II, and is statistically signicant. The e¤ect after
wins can be computed by summing the coe¢ cient estimates for 0 and 1. This sum is close
to zero, conrming our earlier ndings. In the last column of Panel A, we observe that there
seems to be no relationship between ex ante probabilities and stock market reactions. Thus,
the main implication of models that assume rational investors is not borne out in our data.
To further test this implication, Panel B of Table VI reports results from the estimation
of the model in equation (4) under the restricted parameters. Since the model implies both
equality and inequality restrictions, we estimate the model using quadratic programming. In
particular, we estimate the model under the parameter restrictions above and we test the
null hypothesis that these restrictions jointly hold against the alternative hypothesis that the
restrictions do not hold. Kodde and Palm (1986) develop a Wald test for joint equality and
inequality restrictions. The last column of Table VI reports the Kodde-Palm Wald-Dtest
statistic. For all games taken together the Wald-D statistic is 9.274. Under the null, the
probability of observing a Wald-D statistic of 9.274 or larger is 0.018.
The fundamental reason the economic explanations are rejected in our data is that the
loss e¤ect picked up by the intercept in equation (4) is too large to be explained by the win
probability. To see this, consider a model in which investors are rational. This implies that
E(Wit) should be identical to pit, and thus the average number of wins in the sample (i.e.,
the average of Wit) should converge to the average pit as the sample size increases. Since the
large soccer nations are overrepresented in our sample, the average pit is 0.62. One immediate
implication of this result is that the loss e¤ect should be of opposite sign, and approximately
0:62=0:38 = 1:6 times the magnitude, of the win e¤ect. This implication has already been
rejected by the evidence in Table II, which shows that the loss e¤ect is 13 times as large as
the win e¤ect.
2.5.2 Portfolio Characteristics and Local Ownership
To the extent the mood of local investors drives our results, we would expect stocks with
especially high local ownership to be more sensitive to soccer results. The models of Merton
(1987) and Gehrig (1993) predict that foreigners underweight stocks for which their infor-
50
mational disadvantages are greatest. It seems reasonable to believe that foreigners are at a
greater informational disadvantage in small stocks, which have low analyst and media cov-
erage (Bhushan (1989)), and in growth rms, where hardaccounting information is a less
important driver of rm value. This prediction nds support in Kang and Stulz (1997) and
Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), who document that small rms are underweighted by for-
eign investors in Japan and Sweden, respectively. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) also nd
that foreigners prefer rms with large cash positions on their balance sheets, which is a fea-
ture of value stocks. Moreover, even holding local ownership constant, investor sentiment is
more likely to a¤ect small stocks as they are disproportionately held by individual investors
(Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991)) and are less interesting to potential arbitrageurs who would
act to eliminate any mispricing. Indeed, many market anomalies,such as the January and
Monday e¤ects are stronger in small stocks, and Baker and Wurgler (2006) nd that small
stocks are more strongly a¤ected by investor sentiment. Hence, di¤erences in both the extent
of local ownership and the e¤ect of sentiment given a particular ownership structure lead to
the cross-sectional prediction that soccer results should have a greater e¤ect on a small stock
index than a large stock index, and on a growth index than a value index.
Panel A of Table VII reports the results from estimating the model in equation (2) using
pairs of small/large or value/growth indices. The Appendix describes our index selection.
The results show that the loss e¤ect is stronger in small-cap indices. The point estimate
after losses is  0.245 basis points, two-and-a-half times the estimate of  0.093 for large-cap
indices. The  15.2 basis point di¤erence is statistically signicant at below the 10% level
using a one-sided test. By contrast, the loss e¤ect is of the same magnitude in both value and
growth indices. The value-growth loss e¤ect is the same as the e¤ect for the overall market
index. Thus, the result could possibly be explained by foreigners having equal access to the
individual rms that constitute the value-growth indices.
2.5.3 Liquidity
This section investigates whether the loss e¤ect is driven by changes in liquidity. If investors
are hung over on the day after a match, they may not want to participate in the stock
market that day, causing a reduced order ow. If su¢ ciently many local investors stay away
from the market, the greater execution time for a trade may induce sellers to accept a lower
price. To investigate the liquidity hypothesis, we use data on aggregate trading volume on
the stocks in the national index.
To measure abnormal trading volume, we model expected volume using a ltering pro-
cedure similar to the one in Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992). In particular, expected
volume is constructed in the following way. Let Vit be the log of aggregate trading volume for
the constituent shares of country is stock index (from Datastream). We run the regression
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Vit = 0ixit + uit, where xit is a set of explanatory variables. Next, we estimate variance
according to log(u^2it) = 1iyit + it, where yit is a second set of explanatory variables. Finally,
we dene w^it = ai + biu^it= exp(^iyit=2), where ai and bi are chosen so that w^it has zero mean
and unit variance. For the mean volume regression, xit includes day-of-the-week and month
dummies, two lags of volume, a time trend, and the time trend squared. For the variance
equation, yt includes the variables in xit except the two lags of volume. The procedure es-
sentially generates, for each country, a mean zero time series of abnormal volume with unit
variance. The normalization of all the time series eliminates the heterogeneity in volatility
across countries. The e¤ect of soccer match outcomes on volume is estimated using the model
w^it = 0 + WWit + LLit + it.
The sample includes 34 countries from the original sample for which Datastream provides
volume data.32 For most countries Datastream volume data do not start until the beginning
of the 1980s, which reduces the number of soccer matches that can be included in the sample.
Table VIII reports results using the abnormal volume time series. If the loss e¤ect is caused
by a reduction in market liquidity on the days after a soccer game, we would expect to see
a reduction in volume on these days. For elimination games, the point estimates are positive
but insignicant for both wins and losses. For the sample of all games, the point estimates
of abnormal volume are all negative but again insignicant. Thus, there does not seem to be
any reliable decrease in volume on the loss days. We therefore conclude that the loss e¤ect
is not related to a reduction in market liquidity, at least when liquidity is measured using
trading volume.
By contrast, under a behavioral story there are no clear predictions as to the e¤ect of
mood changes on volume. Although one might expect a bad mood to cause inactivity and
inertia in traders, it is equally plausible that investors may trade more to take their minds o¤
the soccer defeat. Indeed, there is ample psychological evidence that agents engage in mood
regulation, taking actions to x their mood. For example, Erber and Tesser (1992) note
that exerting e¤ort on a task may be one way to successfully overcome sad moodsand nd
evidence that a negative mood is attenuated by performing challenging tasks. Trading is a
plausible example of such a task: Not only is it a cognitively intense activity, but it also has
the potential of generating prots to negate the negative mood.
2.6 Conclusion
Motivated by the abundance of psychological evidence showing that sports results have a
strong e¤ect on mood, this paper investigates the stock market e¤ect of international soccer
results. We document a strong negative stock market reaction to losses by national soccer
32Compared to the 39 countries in Table IX, the missing countries are Bahrain, Croatia, Jordan, Nigeria,
and Saudi Arabia.
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teams. The size of the loss e¤ect is economically signicant in monthly terms, the excess
returns associated with a soccer loss exceeds 7%. We nd a statistically signicant but smaller
loss e¤ect for international cricket, rugby, and basketball games. There is no evidence of a
corresponding reaction to wins in any of these sports.
The nding that the e¤ect is not priced into the index when a loss is highly expected leads
us to reject the view that the loss e¤ect stems from the reaction of rational investors to cash
ow relevant information. Instead, we interpret the e¤ect as resulting from the impact of
sports results on investor mood. There are several justications for this interpretation. First,
soccer results have been demonstrated to impact mood but have little direct economic impact.
Second, the e¤ect is more pronounced in countries where soccer is especially important, for
games in the World Cup, and for elimination games. These important matches are precisely
the games with greatest mood impact. Third, the e¤ect is especially large in small stocks.
Small stocks have been previously found to be especially sensitive to investor sentiment, and
are predominantly held by local investors, whose mood is a¤ected by the performance of the
national soccer team.
The magnitude of the loss e¤ect, and its concentration in Western European countries
with developed stock markets, suggests that investors may obtain large excess returns by
trading on these mood events, for instance, by shorting futures on both countries indices
before an important match to exploit the asymmetry of the e¤ect. However, the events we
cover do not occur with enough frequency to justify a portfolio fully dedicated to trading
on them. Moreover, because the e¤ect seems to be particularly strong in small stocks and
involves shorting, even traders that face low transaction costs would nd it challenging to take
advantage of the price drop. Our principal contribution is not to identify a protable trading
strategy, however, but to document that mood can have a large e¤ect on stock returns. In
light of our ndings, this paper signicantly expands the existing evidence linking mood to
asset prices.
2.7 Appendix
2.7.1 Stock Index Returns and Index Volume
Returns are obtained fromDatastream, and are computed using a total return index (assuming
that dividends are reinvested). If the total return index is unavailable, we use a price index
instead. Index returns are measured in the local currency. The starting date of the index for
country i is selected to ensure that the market is reasonably liquid at the time of the starting
date. The starting date is the rst date for which the ve-day average number of rms in the
index is at least 10 and the average number of rms (over a ve-day period) that experienced
a price change is greater than 50%.
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We use the total return indices with a Datastream mnemonic that starts with TOTMK.
Datastream does not provide TOTMK indices for seven countries in our sports data. For
Croatia, Slovakia, and Lithuania we use the Nomura price index. For Bahrain, Jordan,
Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia we use the S&P/IFCG indices from Standard & Poors Global
Index Series. The index returns for Argentina, Czech Republic, Indonesia, Poland, Romania,
and Russia are very volatile and contain extreme returns in the rst few months of the
series. Based on a visual inspection we trim the beginning of these time series. Only four
basketball wins are lost because of this trimming. The return time series for South Korea,
Indonesia, and Nigeria exhibit a persistent and dramatic increase in volatility in September
1997, August 1997, and April 1999, respectively. Whenever we use these time series in our
analysis, we include a dummy variable that takes the value one before these dates and zero
otherwise. None of our reported results are inuenced by the trimming or the inclusion of the
time dummies. The second column of Table IX reports the starting date for the returns time
series.
For the analysis in Table VII we use data on large indices for 18 countries out of the 39
soccer countries listed in Table IX. Namely, we include as large-cap indices the Australia ASX-
20, Austria ATX Prime, Belgium BEL-20, Denmark Copenhagen KFX, England FTSE-100,
France CAC-40, Germany DAX-30, Greece Athens SE General, Ireland ISEQ, Italy Milan
Comit-30, Japan Nikkei-225, Netherlands AEX, Norway OBX, Portugal PSI-20, South Korea
Kospi-200, Spain IBEX-35, Sweden OMX-30, and Switzerland MSCI. The small indices are
those provided by HSBC via Datastream for the list of countries for which we have a large
index. The growth and value indices are from Standard and Poors, both available from
Datastream for 34 out of the 39 soccer countries listed in Table IX. Owing to data limitations
with the return series, we use the price series for all of these indices.
Datastream uses the same calendar for all countries and does not provide information
about holidays. To avoid computing returns for holidays, we identify holidays as days on
which the price of fewer than three of the stocks in the index moved and there was no trading
volume. This procedure identies more than 95% of the holidays. We identify the remaining
holidays using the same two criteria separately.
Volume data is available for all countries for which Datastream provides a TOTMK index.
For some countries, the volume data contain multiple zero-volume days at the beginning of
the time series. We set the start date of the time series as the rst date on which volume
exceeds 100 for ve consecutive days.
2.7.2 Soccer
We obtain international soccer results from 1973 through 2004 from the website www.rdasilva.
demon.co.uk. We manually check the data for errors using various sources, including the
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websites of the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the Union des
Associations Européennes de Football (UEFA).
To enter our sample, Datastream must provide a national stock market index with daily
returns and a country needs to be recorded with at least one win or one loss (over the time
period for which we have return data) in either the World Cup or the continental cups. These
criteria result in a sample of 41 countries. However, given the large number and strong
popularity of club sports (baseball, basketball, American football, and ice hockey) in Canada
and the U.S., these countries are excluded. Table IX lists the 39 countries that are included.
In the 1974 and 1978 World Cups, eight teams proceeded from the group stage to a
second-round playo¤ series. The winner and runner-up from this playo¤ stage qualied for
the nal. We dene all games in the second-round series as elimination games. A similar
format was used in the 1982 World Cup, but 12 teams proceeded to the second round and
the four top teams played in the semi-nals. For this year we also dene the second-round
games as elimination games.
2.7.3 Cricket
Traditionally, cricket is played over multiple days (with a maximum of ve). This does not
lend itself easily to a study that relates game outcome to stock market response because
it is not obvious when the outcome of the game became clear. However, since cricket is
the main sport in many South Asian countries, we include One Day International (ODI)
cricket matches in our sample of other sports. The International Cricket Council (ICC) World
Championship is played as ODIs and we collect game results for eight World Championships
played between 1975 and 2003. We obtain the cricket results from the website of the ICC,
www.icc-cricket.com. We dene as cricket nations those that were ranked in the top 10
countries every year between 2002 and 2005 (the top 10 do not change over this period).
When we restrict the sample countries to those that have stock market data on Datastream,
we are left with seven cricket nations: Australia, England, India, New Zealand, Pakistan,
South Africa, and Sri Lanka. Table IX reports the number of cricket wins and losses.
2.7.4 Rugby
We obtain international rugby data from the website www.rugbyinternational.net. Data
for Australia from 2001 and for South Africa were unavailable from the website owing to a
broken link and were obtained directly from the website owners. We study all games in the
Six Nations, Tri Nations, and the nal stages of the World Cup. Rugby nations are dened as
the countries that participate in the Tri Nations (Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa)
or Six Nations (England, Wales, Scotland, Ireland, France, and Italy). Scotland and Wales
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are excluded because they have no independent stock market, leaving us with seven rugby
nations. Table IX reports the number of rugby wins and losses.
2.7.5 Ice Hockey
We collect ice hockey data from the website www.iihf.com of the International Ice Hockey
Federation (IIHF) and the independent website www.hockeynut.com. The hockey matches
consist of the World Championships (1998 to 2004), Olympics (1980 to 2002), and World
Cup/Canada Cup (1996 and 2004) competitions. We dene ice hockey nations as the top
10 countries based on performance in the 2004, 2003, 2002, and 2001 World Championships
and the 2002 Olympics. As for soccer, the U.S. is excluded: Not only does hockey lag behind
baseball, American football, and basketball, but also any hockey interest is focused on the
National Hockey League rather than international matches (the NHL playo¤s occur at the
same time as the World Championships, meaning many top players do not participate in the
latter). Latvia is excluded because of no stock market data. This leaves us with the following
eight hockey nations: Canada, Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Russia, Slovakia, Sweden,
and Switzerland. Table IX reports the number of ice hockey wins and losses.
2.7.6 Basketball
We obtain World Championship and Olympic basketball results from www.fiba.com. The
website contains, for each tournament, the names of the two opponents, the round, and the
result. Unfortunately it does not contain dates, so these have to be obtained from a va-
riety of other sources. Olympic dates are obtained from sports.espn.go.com/oly/index
for 2004 and 2000, and www.sunmedia.ca/OlympicsBasketball/sked.html for 1996. World
Championship dates are obtained from www.insidehoops.com/wbc.shtml for 2002 and the
Associated Press headlines for 1998; see amarillo.com/sports/index080498.html as an
example of headlines for a particular day. For the 1992 Olympics and the 1994 World Cham-
pionships, the U.S.dates are obtained from www.usocpressbox.org. Since games in each
round take place on the same day, we could then work out the dates for all other teams
matches for the entire 1994 World Championships and the quarter-nals onward for the 1992
Olympics.
To dene basketball nations, we follow the same approach as for soccer and require that
a country participated in a signicant number of basketball events. This requirement elim-
inates Japan, Turkey, Venezuela, South Korea, Croatia, and Nigeria. A total of 27 games
are lost because of this requirement. We also remove Australia and New Zealand because at
least two other sports (cricket and rugby) are more important in terms of attention in these
countries. Again, we remove the U.S. owing to the substantially greater focus on club sports
and college basketball. Many top American NBA players do not participate, in contrast to
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other countries which are at close to full strength. This is consistent with the limited media
coverage of international basketball in the U.S. These removals leave us with 11 basketball
nations: Argentina, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Rus-
sia, and Spain. Table IX shows reports the number of basketball wins and losses for these
eleven countries.
2.7.7 Multiple Games on One Day
If a country plays an international game in more than one of the sports (soccer, cricket, rugby,
ice hockey, and basketball) on a single day, we remove the observation if the country wins
in one sport and loses in another. If the outcome is the same in all sports, we keep the
observation. For example, England won a cricket match and a rugby match on February 17th
and 24th, 2003. All four of these observations are kept. This adjustment a¤ects less than 1%
of our sample of games.
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Table I
Number of Wins and Losses in International Team Sport Matches and Percent
Mean Daily Return on the First Trading Day After Matches
The table reports the number of wins and losses in international soccer, cricket, rugby, ice hockey, and bas-
ketball matches. The soccer matches are played over the period 1973 to 2004 in the World Cup, European
Championship, Copa America, Asian Cup, World Cup qualifying stages, and European Championship qual-
ifying stages. The cricket matches are One Day Internationals played over the period 1975 to 2004. The
rugby matches are Six Nations, Tri Nations, and World Cup matches between 1973 and 2004. The ice hockey
matches are the World Championships (1998 to 2004), Olympics (1980 to 2002), and World Cup/Canada Cup
(1996 and 2004) competitions. The basketball matches are the Olympics (1992 to 2004) and World Champi-
onships (1994 to 2002) tournaments. The mean returns reported in the table are computed from the log daily
return on national stock market indices (from Datastream) on the rst trading day after wins and losses. The
Appendix details the country selection for each sport. Elimination matches are matches in which the loser
is eliminated from further play in the tournament. Group games are played during the championship and
qualies teams for the elimination stage. Close qualifying games are played to qualify for the championship
by two teams with a di¤erence in Elo rating below 125 points, after adding 100 points to the team with home
advantage.
No games Wins Losses
N Mean Std. N Mean Std. N Mean Std.
Panel A. International Soccer (39 countries)
No games 181,796 0.058 1.449
All games 638 0.050 1.474 524  0.184 1.547
World Cup elimination games 76 0.172 1.306 56  0.359 1.901
World Cup group games 115  0.067 1.535 81  0.516 1.329
World Cup close qualifying games 137  0.067 2.089 122  0.074 1.304
Continental cups elimination games 101  0.044 1.021 82  0.330 1.544
Continental cups group games 128 0.164 1.186 117 0.035 1.838
European Champ. close qualifying games 81 0.239 1.121 66  0.036 1.235
Panel B. Other International Team Sports (25 countries)
No games 120,416 0.054 1.438
All games 903  0.040 1.823 645  0.153 1.838
Cricket 153  0.071 2.908 88  0.210 3.413
Rugby 403  0.161 1.117 307  0.152 1.091
Ice hockey 238 0.139 1.707 148  0.018 1.305
Basketball 111 0.071 2.166 102  0.302 2.315
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Table II
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After International Soccer Matches
The analysis is based on soccer wins and losses for 39 countries (see the Appendix). The average time series
has 4,690 trading days, which gives a total of 182,919 daily return observations. The table reports the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates of W and L from
it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit;
where uit is an error term that is allowed to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across
countries, Wit is a dummy variable that takes the value one if country i wins a soccer match on a day that
makes t the rst trading day after the match and zero otherwise, and Lit is a dummy variable for losses
dened analogously. If games are mutually exclusive (such as elimination games, group games, and qualifying
matches), Wit and Lit are vectors, where each element corresponds to a game type. In Panel A the its are
the raw residuals ^it dened by the regression
Rit = 0i + 1iRit 1 + 2iRmt 1 + 3iRmt + 4iRmt+1 + 5iDt + 6iQt + ^it;
where Rit denotes the continuously compounded local return on date t in country i, Rmt is the continuously
compounded daily U.S. dollar return on Datastreams world market index on day t, Dt = fD1t; D2t; D3t; D4tg
are dummy variables for Monday through Thursday, and Qt = fQ1t; Q2t; Q3t; Q4t; Q5tg are dummy variables
for days for which the previous one through ve days are non-weekend holidays. Panel B reports the estimates
for W and L when the abnormal normalized returns dened in Section III.B are used in the panel
regression. These normalized residuals are the second-stage residuals of a panel regression such as the one
for ^it after a GARCH correction and normalizing them to have unit variance. The reported t-statistic is
computed by allowing the variance of uit to be country specic (i.e., 2i is estimated for all countries) and by
allowing for contemporaneous cross-country correlations (ij is estimated for all pairs of countries.) See the
caption in Table I and the Appendix for sample details.
Wins Losses
Num.
games W t-val
Num.
games L t-val
Panel A. Abnormal Raw Returns
All games 638 0.016 0.27 524  0.212  3.27
Elimination games 177 0.046 0.43 138  0.384  3.24
World Cup elimination games 76 0.090 0.53 56  0.494  2.71
Continental cups elimination games 101 0.013 0.09 82  0.309  1.99
Group games 243 0.052 0.53 198  0.168  1.47
World Cup group games 115 0.007 0.05 81  0.380  2.23
Continental cups group games 128 0.092 0.67 117  0.022  0.14
Close qualifying games 218  0.049  0.52 188  0.131  1.29
World Cup close qualifying games 137  0.095  0.78 122  0.132  1.05
European Championship close qualifying games 81 0.029 0.19 66  0.130  0.75
Panel B. Abnormal Normalized Returns
All games 638  0.019  0.47 524  0.157  3.68
Elimination games 177 0.026 0.35 138  0.182  2.17
Group games 243  0.034  0.52 198  0.179  2.57
Close qualifying games 218  0.038  0.58 188  0.116  1.65
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Table III
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After International Soccer Matches
for the Top Seven Soccer Nations
The table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of W and L from
~it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit;
where ~it are the abnormal normalized returns dened in Section III.B and described in Table II. Wit is
a dummy variable that takes the value one if country i wins a sports match on a day that makes t the rst
trading day after the match and zero otherwise, and Lit is a dummy variable for losses dened analogously. If
games are mutually exclusive (such as elimination games, group games, and qualifying matches), Wit and Lit
are vectors, where each element corresponds to a game type. In Panel A, the Top Seven soccer nations are:
Argentina, Brazil, England, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Panel B reports results for the remaining 32
soccer nations in our sample. The table reports results for soccer matches played over the period 1973 to 2004
in the World Cup, European Championship, Copa America, Asian Cup, World Cup qualifying stages, and
European Championship qualifying stages. The reported t-statistics are computed by allowing the variance
of uit to be country specic (i.e., 2i is estimated for all countries) and by allowing for contemporaneous
cross-country correlations (ij is estimated for all pairs of countries.)
Wins Losses
Num.
games W t-val
Num.
games L t-val
Panel A. Top Seven Soccer Nations
All games 251 0.056 0.92 121  0.217  2.59
World Cup games 142 0.065 0.80 67  0.374  3.30
Continental cup games 109 0.044 0.48 54  0.021  0.17
Elimination games 101 0.148 1.55 52  0.221  1.70
Group games and close qualiers 150  0.006  0.08 69  0.213  1.96
Panel B. Other Soccer Nations (32 countries)
All games 387  0.067  1.38 403  0.139  2.89
World Cup games 186  0.102  1.42 192  0.183  2.60
Continental cup games 201  0.034  0.51 211  0.099  1.50
Elimination games 76  0.135  1.26 86  0.158  1.54
Group games and close qualiers 311  0.050  0.92 317  0.134  2.46
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Table IV
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After International Soccer Matches
Using Portfolio Returns and Samples Trimmed of Outliers
Let ~it be the abnormal normalized returnsdened in Section III.B and described in Table II. For each date
t for which either Wit = 1 or Lit = 1 for some i, we average ~it over all countries with Wit = 1 and average ~it
over all countries with Lit = 1. This yields two time series of (normalized) portfolio returns, ~Lt and ~Wt, for
losing countries and winning countries, respectively. Panel A in the table reports the average over all dates of
~Lt and ~Wt under the mean column. In Panel A, column Nreports the number of dates for which the above
portfolios can be constructed. The t-statistics reported are obtained by using SD(~jt)=
p
N   1 as an estimate
of the standard error of the mean. Panel B reports 10%-trimmed means of the residuals ~it. Observations
for which variable Lit equals one and the residual is smaller than the 10th percentile or larger than the 90th
percentile are removed from the sample. Observations for which Wit equals one are removed in a similar way.
Compared to Table II this removes 20% of the sample. In Panel B, column Nreports the number of games.
The t-statistics for the trimmed means are based on standard asymptotic approximations to the distribution
of trimmed means (Huber (1996)).
Wins Losses
N W t-val N L t-val
Panel A. Portfolio Returns
All games 389  0.033  0.79 358  0.149  3.33
Elimination games 113  0.014  0.18 96  0.199  2.15
Group games 137 0.038 0.56 125  0.164  2.19
Close qualifying games 155  0.096  1.37 149  0.075  1.10
Panel B. Trimmed Means
All games 512  0.020  0.59 420  0.126  3.50
Elimination games 143 0.030 0.44 112  0.156  2.34
Group games 195  0.026  0.49 160  0.164  2.63
Close qualifying games 176  0.050  0.85 152  0.065  1.10
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Table V
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After International Cricket, Rugby,
Ice Hockey, and Basketball Matches
The analysis is based on wins and losses for 24 countries (see the Appendix). The average time series has
5,081 trading days, which gives a total of 121,940 daily return observations. The table reports the ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimates of W and L from
~it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit; (27)
where ~it are the abnormal normalized returnsdened as in Section III.B. Wit is a dummy variable that
takes the value one if country i wins a sports match on a day that makes t the rst trading day after the match
and zero otherwise, and Lit is a dummy variable for losses dened analogously. If games are mutually exclusive
(cricket games, rugby games, etc.), Wit and Lit are vectors, where each element corresponds to a game type.
The table reports results for One Day International cricket matches played over the period 1975 to 2004, Six
Nations, Tri Nations, and World Cup rugby matches played between 1973 and 2004, World Championships
(1998 to 2004), Olympics (1980 to 2002), and World Cup/Canada Cup (1996 and 2004) ice hockey matches,
and Olympics (1992 to 2004) and World Championships (1994 to 2002) basketball matches. The Appendix
details the country selection for each sport. Panel A reports the estimates using the full cross-section of
countries. The t-statistics are computed by allowing the variance of uit to be country specic (i.e., 2i is
estimated for all countries) and by allowing for contemporaneous cross-country correlations (ij is estimated
for all pairs of countries). Panels B and C replicate the analysis in Table IV for the data on these four other
sports. In Panels A and C, column Nreports the number of games. In Panel B, column Nreports the
number of dates for which there is a least one win (left side of the table) or at least one loss (right side of the
table).
Wins Losses
N W t-val N L t-val
Panel A. Abnormal Returns
All games 903  0.013  0.39 645  0.084  2.21
Cricket 153  0.057  0.73 88  0.187  1.85
Rugby 403  0.086  1.73 307  0.095  1.74
Ice hockey 238 0.105 1.57 148 0.083 1.02
Basketball 111 0.071 0.74 102  0.208  2.11
Panel B. Abnormal Portfolio Performance
All games 503  0.073  1.68 442  0.083  1.88
Cricket 99  0.146  1.08 70  0.331  2.26
Rugby 275  0.123  2.23 257  0.087  1.55
Ice hockey 106 0.099 1.30 89 0.125 1.50
Basketball 40 0.061 0.73 42  0.101  1.06
Panel C. Trimmed Means
All games 723 0.019 0.66 517  0.088  2.53
Cricket 123 0.031 0.50 72  0.301  3.02
Rugby 323  0.058  1.25 247  0.083  1.65
Ice hockey 192 0.112 1.99 120 0.079 1.08
Basketball 89 0.067 0.93 82  0.167  1.91
66
Table VI
Predicted Outcomes and Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After
International Soccer Matches, 1993 to 2004
The table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for the model
~it = 0 + 1Wit + 2pit + vit;
where ~it is the error term from estimating equation (1) without the soccer dummy variables and using
normalized stock index returns, Wit is a dummy variable that equals one if country i wins a soccer match on a
day that makes t the rst trading day after the match and zero if a game is lost, pit is the ex ante probability
that country i wins the game, and vit is an error term with mean zero and variance 2v. The analysis is based
on 39 countries (see the Appendix). The sample period is January 1993 through November 2004. Panel A
reports results for matches played in the World Cup. Panel B reports results for matches played in the World
Cup, the European Championship, the Asian Cup, and Copa America. The probabilities pit are computed
using Elo ratings employing the methodology detailed in Section IV.A. Elimination matches are matches in
which the loser is eliminated from further play in the tournament. The parentheses contains t-statistics. The
last column reports the Kodde and Palm (1986) Wald test statistic for the test of a null hypothesis that
involves inequality restrictions.
Num.
games 0 (t-value) 1 (t-value) 2 (t-value) Wald-D (p-value)
Panel A. Unrestricted Model
All games 1,118 -0.162 (-3.06) 0.142 (2.18) -0.004 (-0.03)
Elimination games 297 -0.192 (-1.97) 0.223 (1.88) 0.041 ( 0.13)
Group games 420 -0.195 (-2.18) 0.153 (1.33) -0.041 (-0.17)
Close qualifying games 401 -0.110 (-1.16) 0.077 (0.72) 0.005 ( 0.01)
Panel B. Restricted Model
All games 1,118 0.138 (2.11) -0.138 (-2.11) 9.274 (0.018)
Elimination games 297 0.215 (1.81) -0.215 (-1.81) 2.643 (0.358)
Group games 420 0.150 (1.30) -0.150 (-1.30) 5.263 (0.112)
Close qualifying games 401 0.074 (0.69) -0.074 (-0.69) 2.007 (0.469)
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Table VII
Abnormal Daily Stock Market Performance After International Soccer Matches
for Size Sorted Portfolios and Value-Growth Sorted Portfolios, 1990 to 2004
The table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of W and L from
~it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit; (28)
where uit is an error term that is allowed to be contemporaneously correlated between countries, Wit is a
dummy variable that takes the value one if country i wins a soccer match on a day that makes t the rst
trading day after the match and zero otherwise, and Lit is a dummy variable for losses dened analogously.
~it are the abnormal normalized returnsdened in Section III.B and described in Table II, where the stock
market indices are now a large-cap index, small-cap index, growth index, or a value index. The small indices
are those provided by HSBC via Datastream for the list of 18 countries for which we have a large index (see
the Appendix for details). The growth and value indices are from Standard and Poors, both available from
Datastream for 34 out of the 39 countries in Table IX.
Wins Losses
Num.
games W t-val
Num.
games L t-val
Small stocks 243  0.141  2.50 157  0.245  3.32
Large stocks 243  0.007  0.12 157  0.093  1.33
Test of di¤erence  0.134  1.67  0.152  1.50
Growth stocks 391  0.096  2.10 290  0.149  2.83
Value stocks 391  0.085  1.64 290  0.141  2.58
Test of di¤erence  0.011  0.16  0.008  0.10
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Table VIII
Abnormal Trading Volume After International Soccer Matches
The table reports the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of W and L from
w^it = 0 + WWit + LLit + uit;
where w^it is abnormal volume constructed in a way that follows Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992). Speci-
cally, let Vit be the log of aggregate trading volume for the constituent shares of country is stock index (from
Datastream). Run the regression Vit = 0ixit+uit, where xit is a set of explanatory variables. Next, estimate
variance according to log(u^2it) = 1iyit + it, where yit is a second set of explanatory variables. Finally, dene
w^it = ai+biu^it= exp(^iyit=2), where ai and bi are chosen so that w^it has zero mean and unit variance. For the
volume regressions, xit include day-of-the-week and month dummies, two lags of volume, a time trend, and the
time trend squared. For the variance equation, yt includes the variables in xit except the two lags of volume.
Elimination matches are matches for which the loser is eliminated from further play in the tournament. The
sample includes all countries for which Datastream provides volume data, which leaves us with a sample of
34 countries. Compared to the 39 countries in Table AI, the missing countries are Bahrain, Croatia, Jordan,
Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia. For most countries Datastream volume data do not start until the beginning of
the 1980s. The t-statistics are computed by allowing the variance of uit to be country specic, and ujt and
uit to be contemporaneously correlated.
Wins Losses
Num.
games W t-val
Num.
games L t-val
All games 449  0.045  0.90 379  0.018  0.33
Elimination games 109 0.026 0.23 97 0.149 1.41
Group games 191  0.119  1.54 160  0.133  1.64
Close qualifying games 149  0.001  0.02 122 0.001 0.01
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Table IX
Mean Daily Percent National Index Return and Number of Wins and Losses in
International Team Sport Matches
Soccer Cricket Rugby Ice hockey Basketball
Country
Time series
begins
Mean
log return W L W L W L W L W L
Argentina 19900108 0.124 28 16 15 9
Australia 19730109 0.047 5 9 40 16 54 46
Austria 19830427 0.056 8 11
Bahrain 20000503 0.050 4 3
Belgium 19730109 0.042 30 31
Brazil 19940711 0.072 37 7 5 16
Canada 19730109 0.041 47 17 8 8
Chile 19890711 0.089 12 24
China 19930706 0.026 9 11 7 21
Colombia 19920116 0.061 30 17
Croatia 19960412 0.055 12 9
Czech Republic 19940315 0.019 8 7 39 13
Denmark 19820108 0.051 27 23
England 19730102 0.050 25 26 31 17 97 58
Finland 19880406 0.046 42 17
France 19730109 0.050 42 20 109 46 3 3
Germany 19730109 0.031 54 19 9 28 8 4
Greece 19880112 0.073 12 12 11 8
India 19900109 0.071 18 14
Indonesia 19900410 0.019 1 8
Ireland 19780111 0.061 14 15 54 74
Italy 19730109 0.050 45 18 8 35 10 7
Japan 19730110 0.020 21 14
Jordan 19950707 0.064 2 2
Lithuania 19960111 0.034 14 7
Mexico 19880415 0.107 22 16
Netherlands 19730109 0.043 43 28
New Zealand 19880210 0.042 19 12 54 23
Nigeria 19950706 0.096 2 4
Norway 19800221 0.049 8 11
Pakistan 19920723 0.052 11 8
Peru 19940201 0.045 12 17
Poland 19940308 0.010 3 7
Portugal 19900123 0.027 15 9
Romania 19970509 0.085 5 6
Russia 19940726 0.102 7 10 21 16 12 8
Saudi Arabia 19980102 0.091 5 8
Slovakia 19970402 0.019 25 16
South Africa 19730109 0.072 3 2 19 10 27 25
South Korea 19870916 0.028 20 15
Spain 19870309 0.043 20 15 18 11
Sri Lanka 19900424 0.049 15 11
Sweden 19820112 0.061 17 17 41 19
Switzerland 19730202 0.032 16 17 14 22
Thailand 19870112 0.051 1 11
Turkey 19880112 0.212 12 13
Venezuela 19930126 0.115 1 16
All countries 0.056 638 524 153 88 403 307 238 148 111 102
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3 Leverage, Ownership Concentration, and the Tension
Between Liquidity and Investment
3.1 Introduction
Investors wish managers to pursue the best available projects, but would also like the option
to liquidate the rm if only loss-making projects will be undertaken. This paper studies the
fundamental tension between these two objectives. By retaining the option to liquidate early
upon weak interim performance, investors can minimize their losses if the manager turns
out to be unskilled. Furthermore, if managerial quality is ex ante heterogeneous, this threat
can screen out incompetent managers. However, if the manager turns out to be skilled, the
threat of liquidation may deter him from undertaking optimal long-term projects that risk
short-term turbulence.
This paper analyzes two roles of debt that allow it to mitigate this tension. First, leverage
passes control to creditors if short-term earnings are low. This is a credible commitment to
liquidate since creditorsconvex claims make them biased towards shut-down (Aghion and
Bolton (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)). However, debt is not the only method of
achieving such a control shift.The same e¤ect could be achieved by imposing a mandatory
dividend schedule and contracting that the manager is red if the required dividend payments
are not met. Such a threat is credible if there is a su¢ ciently high likelihood that low earn-
ings result from managerial incompetence rather than a temporary downturn in a protable
project. Indeed, in many corporate nance models concerned with signaling (Ross (1977)) or
managerial discipline (Stulz (1990), Zwiebel (1996)), total payout is the critical variable and
so debt and dividends are interchangeable substitutes. Similarly, in theories of outside eq-
uity nance (e.g. Myers (2000)), the requirement to make regular dividend payments renders
equity similar to debt.
In this paper, debt di¤ers from dividends as it plays a second role: motivating information
acquisition. Leverage allows a given dollar investment to translate into a higher percentage
of the outstanding equity. This concentration e¤ectgives shareholders strong incentives to
acquire costly information on the underlying cause of poor performance. If it results from
desirable long-term investment, they can persuade the creditor not to shut down the rm. If
information is hard, they can disclose it to the creditor; if it is soft, they can buy out the
creditor, renegotiate, or write credit protection. In sum, returns to investment depend on the
intensity of ex post monitoring; information acquisition by investors attenuates managerial
myopia. Debt is a means of inducing information acquisition. If the only role of debt is to
shift control, borderline risky debt is optimal as strictly risky debt leads to the debt overhang
e¤ect of Myers (1977). Where debt also concentrates equity, strictly risky debt is preferred.
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By contrast, an equityholder in an unlevered rm has insu¢ cient incentives to gather
information: in the absence of leverage, her gains from optimal continuation of a poorly
performing rm are too small. Anticipating that they may be red upon interim losses,
managers ine¢ ciently shun long-term projects. This problem is su¤ered whether or not the
rm is publicly traded. The root cause of myopia is not the managers concern with the short-
term stock price, but ring decisions being taken on the basis of short-term earnings because
shareholders have insu¢ cient incentives to investigate the rms fundamental value. Taking
the rm private but maintaining dispersed ownership will not solve the issue. Giving the
manager a long-term contract that safeguards him from interim ring will address myopia,
but at the same time prevent desirable liquidation: there is no control shift. I therefore
demonstrate that a levered structure (LEV) is optimal as it allows both liquidation and
long-term investment, compared to an unlevered rm with a short-term contract (STU),
which su¤ers from myopia, and an unlevered rms with a long-term contract (LTU), which
prohibits desirable liquidation.
I then extend the analysis to heterogenous manager and investor types. Good managers
have a higher chance of becoming inspiredand being able to choose between a protable
long-term project and a less protable, but still positive-NPV, short-term project. Bad man-
agers will likely become uninspiredand invest in value-destroying projects, in which case
early ring is optimal. Professional investors have more funds to invest than households, and
thus may monitor if their stakes are su¢ ciently concentrated.
I show that a separating equilibrium is sustainable where good managers run LEVs and
are nanced by professional investors; bad managers run STUs and are owned by households.
This equilibrium can be interpreted in two ways. First, it applies to entrepreneurs seeking
nancing for the rst time: the highest quality ones choose greater leverage. Second, it
can be applied to a situation where all rms are currently publicly traded, and only the
good managers choose to seek private equity nancing. The equilibrium approximates reality,
where only a small proportion of rms are nanced by private equity, but typically exhibit
superior performance. Other explanations for the high leverage used in private equity focus
on it either imposing discipline on the manager and/or being a credible signal of quality.
However, mandatory dividends can be used for both of these purposes.
The two purposes of debt identied above, which render an all-LEV equilibrium e¢ cient,
also lead to the sustainability of a separating equilibrium. The control-shift e¤ect of debt
renders it a credible signal of managerial quality. In an STU, the manager is only sometimes
red upon interim losses. The default decision is for the managers employment to continue,
and it requires an active action by the board to terminate his employment, which is not
always forthcoming. However, in a LEV, creditors automatically liquidate a bankrupt rm,
in the absence of further information. This deters bad managers from taking on leverage. The
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concentration e¤ect (not a feature of mandatory dividends) renders debt a desirable signal:
good managers are willing to signal even if it leads to fewer funds, because the funds they
receive are from professional investors who monitor, thus allowing them to engage in long-term
projects. For the same reason, total surplus may also increase, relative to an all-STU pooling
equilibrium, even if good managers receive fewer funds. This result contrasts with standard
separating equilibria, in which an increased fund allocation to good managers is necessary to
induce them to signal, and for signaling to increase total surplus. Rather than being a signal to
obtain more funds at the cost of constraining future investment, leverage increases investment
yet may lead to fewer initial funds. While shareholder returns are higher in LEVs, households
are restricted to investing in STUs. LEVs establish minimum investment requirements to
prevent households from free-riding on professional investorsmonitoring investments, and to
ensure that they are not entirely held by households who do not monitor.
In a number of theories of debt, the manager prefers to be unlevered as debt forces him
to pay out cash ows that he would rather invest in pet projects (e.g. Stulz (1990), Zwiebel
(1996)). However, he is forced to take on leverage to raise nancing in the rst period: debt
either signals high quality, or commits him to pay out future cash ows. As Zwiebel points out,
some of these models are dynamically inconsistent. Since the only benet of debt is as a signal
or commitment device, once funds have been raised, the manager has an incentive to replace
the debt with new equity, thus re-enabling him to invest in pet projects. Zwiebel achieves
dynamic consistency by introducing an ever-present potential raider, so that the manager
retains leverage to continuously commit to paying out cash ows. Debt is still personally
costly to the manager, but forced upon him by takeover threats.
By contrast, in this paper, debt is dynamically consistent because it has other benets
than signaling. Once the manager has signaled his quality in the rst period, he has incentives
to retain leverage (even in the absence of external pressure) to maintain concentrated owner-
ship and monitoring incentives. In traditional models of e¤ort conicts, the monitor reduces
the managers utility by forcing him to exert e¤ort or preventing him from enjoying private
benets. Here, an inspired manager wishes to retain the monitor, even after nancing has
been raised, because she protects him from liquidation if the long-term project su¤ers interim
turbulence. Indeed, since signaling high quality may lead to fewer total funds being raised,
its only benet is to attract potential monitors, and it is necessary to maintain leverage, and
thus monitoring incentives, to enjoy this benet.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 3:2 briey discusses related literature. Section 3:3
presents the model, and illustrates that LEVs may dominate STUs and LTUs owing to the
dual benets of debt. Section 3:4 analyzes a separating equilibrium whereby sophisticated
investors hold the equity of LEVs managed by high-quality managers and household investors
choose STUs run by lower-quality managers. This closely approximates reality. Section 3:5
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discusses wider applications of the key features of the model as well as empirical implications,
and Section 3:6 concludes. The Appendix in Section 3:7 conrms the robustness of the result
to a di¤erent formulation of the managers payo¤s and contains proofs.
3.2 Related Literature
The central result of this paper is that leverage can both signal managerial quality, by allowing
the potential for liquidation, and mitigate myopia through incentivizing monitoring. It is
thus related to both the signaling and information acquisition literatures, both of which have
been extensively developed, but with few interactions. Moreover, the e¤ects of signaling and
monitoring are di¤erent from previous papers, as will be shown.
Commencing with the signaling literature, Ross (1977) illustrates that debt can signal
quality. Managers of bad rms are unwilling to mimic the signal owing to bankruptcy fears.
As in the canonical signaling model of Spence (1973), the signal is directly costly to both types
due to liquidation risk, but especially costly to the bad type. The signal reduces total surplus
owing to bankruptcy costs; signaling is similarly costly in Stein (1989) and Miller and Rock
(1985) as it involves a myopic reduction in investment. There are no o¤setting positive real
e¤ects as separation merely achieves a redistribution from bad to good managers. Extending
these models to incorporate an investment decision would generate real benets, but the gains
hinge on good managers obtaining more funds than in a pooling equilibrium, as the per dollar
productivity of investment is unchanged.
In this paper, signaling raises total surplus even if good managers do not obtain more
funds. Instead, the role of signaling is to attract a more desirable type of funds: professional
investors who have the ability and incentive to monitor. Thus the per dollar productivity of a
good rms investment increases. This added benet of leverage stems from the combination of
di¤erent managerial skill levels, di¤ering investor types and multiple investment opportunities
featured in this paper.
Moving to the monitoring literature, to my knowledge, Gümbel and White (2005) is the
only other paper that also uses debt to incentivize information acquisition.33 Their paper is
the rst to advocate the separation of monitoring (undertaken by equityholders) from decision
making (undertaken by creditors), and to point out that equityholdersconvex claims render
them more likely monitors than creditors who have concave payo¤s. However, the mechanism
through which debt incentivizes monitoring is quite di¤erent. In this paper, leverage increases
the percentage of total equity owned by a given shareholder; there is no such concentration
e¤ect in Gümbel and White as there is a single shareholder. Instead, debt works entirely via a
control shift: allocating control to a toughagent (a bad cop) with a natural bias towards
33In Harris and Raviv (1990), debt leads to information acquisition but this is not through changing incen-
tives. They assume that an audit automatically takes place in bankruptcy.
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shut-down. Since liquidation leaves the equityholder with nothing, she has strong incentives
to gather information to allow the rm to continue (become a good cop). In the absence
of leverage, the rm is su¢ ciently protable that the unlevered shareholder chooses not to
gather information. That it is not in the aggregate claimants interests to monitor implies
that the information acquisition induced by leverage is ex post ine¢ cient, but committing
to monitor has ex ante benets by encouraging managerial e¤ort. In my model, introducing
debt into an STU does not lead to a control shift: an unlevered investor in an STU is already
tough and biased towards closure (the essence of the myopia issue), so only the concentration
e¤ect is at work. As in prior literature, Gümbel and White study an e¤ort issue where the
monitor is an adversary of the manager who deters shirking. In this paper, the monitor is an
ally of the manager, supporting long-term investment and thus providing a dynamic reason
for why the manager may wish to retain her.
The literature features other mechanisms than capital structure to encourage information
gathering, albeit again to overcome an e¤ort conict. In Aghion and Tirole (1997), the prin-
cipal provides information-gathering incentives to an agent by delegating formal authority in
decision making, so that the agent can act on her acquired information. In a similar vein,
Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) show that dispersed equity ownership may provide a cred-
ible commitment for shareholders not to intervene and overrule management decisions, which
in turn provides managers with a greater incentive to gather information. Allen, Bernardo
and Welch (2000) posit that managers pay dividends to attract particular investors to monitor
them.
Two recent papers are closest to this theory. Stein (2005) also analyzes the tension be-
tween liquidation and long-term decisions, within the context of arbitrageurs contemplating
convergence trades. A closed-end fund prevents interim withdrawals and thus alleviates the
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) limits to arbitrageissue, but prevents desirable liquidation if the
manager indeed turns out to be unskilled. Moreover, even if the benet of long-term invest-
ment exceeds this cost, an equilibrium where all funds are closed-end may not be sustainable
as it fails the Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion. A bad manager will not deviate
by open-ending as her fears early liquidation; thus a good manager can signal his ability by
making such a deviation. This paper builds on Stein by adding leverage and a monitoring
technology. Even absent sustainability issues, an all closed-end unlevered equilibrium may
not be optimal. Leverage may allow both long-term investment and liquidation.
Edmans (2007a) also considers the e¤ect of concentrated ownership on ex post monitoring
and ex ante investment decisions. In that paper, monitoring is incentivized by large block-
holdings; there is no special role for debt and no signaling. However, the motivation for
monitoring is very di¤erent. There is no threat of liquidation; instead the source of myopia is
the managers concern with the interim stock price. Informed shareholders are valuable not
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because they intervene to save the manager from liquidation, but because their trading deci-
sions impound information into the stock price, so that it more closely reects fundamental
value rather than current earnings. Specically, if the blockholder does not sell upon weak
earnings, the market infers that the rm is fundamentally sound and the stock price is sup-
ported. Another di¤erence is that Edmans (2007a) exogenously assumes that the manager
cares places weight on the short-term stock price. Here, liquidation upon interim losses is
endogenized as optimal.
3.3 The Model
The core model is based on Steins (2005) framework for open- and closed-end funds, but
applied to corporations. The key additions are a monitoring technology and debt nancing,
which lead to markedly di¤erent results.
A pool of penniless entrepreneurs seek nancing of up to $y for a project. Total rm size
is limited by factors such as diseconomies of scale. Potential investors can each invest up to
$x << y in either debt or equity.34 There are four periods. At t = 0, the manager sets
up a corporation which can adopt one of three di¤erent structures. The rst (STU) is an
unlevered rm where the manager can be (costlessly) red at any stage, which approximates
the majority of public rms in reality. The second (LTU) is an unlevered rm where the
manager has a long-term contract which guarantees his employment until t = 3. The third
(LEV) is a private, levered rm where the manager can be costlessly red at any stage, which
approximates the majority of rms funded by private equity. A LEV is nanced partly by debt
with face value $f and initial market value $d, and the remainder by equity. For simplicity,
I normalize the interest rate to zero and assume all agents are risk-neutral.
At t = 1, with probability  the manager is inspired, i.e. obtains a good investment idea.
An inspired manager can choose to invest in either a Short-Term (ST ) or a Long-Term (LT )
investment project. An uninspired manager invests in unprotable projects that lose money
over time. It is therefore optimal to re him early or liquidate the rm. As will become clear,
ring and liquidating have the same e¤ects, and so these terms will be used interchangeably.
At t = 2, interim performance is observed. In a LTU, the manager can never be red.
In a levered rm, creditors have control if the rms asset value is less than the face value
of debt, and may decide to liquidate the rm. In a STU, the board can choose to re the
manager. If it is in shareholdersinterest to re the manager, based on t = 2 performance,
the board takes the required action with probability .  < 1 reects imperfect alignment
34x is nite either because investors have limited funds or self-imposed limits on how much they can allocate
to one particular investment. These are often stated as an absolute dollar amount or a percentage of their
overall portfolio. The assumption of a maximum investment amount is standard in the literature: see, for
example, Boot and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001).
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of board and shareholder interests, e.g. Mace (1971). It will be shown that it is optimal to
re an underperforming manager: creditors in a LEV will always re the manager, the board
in a STU occasionally re the manager. Hence the only consequence of assuming  < 1 is a
loss-making manager is more likely to be red if his rm is also bankrupt, which is realistic.
Since the t = 2 performance is an imperfect signal, an investor may choose to spend
 to learn the rms value at t = 3, the nal period.35 In e¤ect, she nds out whether
poor performance results from bad luck or bad management. The monitoring technology is
imperfect: with probability , no investor can nd information.36
Both shareholders and creditors have access to this monitoring technology; it will be shown
that only shareholders have the incentive to use it, given their convex claims. Once share-
holders have learned that the manager is inspired, they can disclose this signal to creditors (in
a LEV) or to the board (in a STU) and thus persuade them not to liquidate. This procedure
is straightforward if information is hard, i.e. codiable. If information is instead softand
unveriable, shareholders can renegotiate with creditors, for example by writing credit pro-
tection on the outstanding debt, or buying out or renance the debt for $f as often happens
in private equity workouts. Either way, creditors receive the full face value of $f if an inspired
manager is continued. If shareholders learn that the manager is uninspired, they have the
option to destroy the bad news and pretend that their monitoring e¤orts were unsuccessful.37
As in Stein (2005), the managers objective function consists purely of private benets,
which are increasing in both shareholder value and the longevity of the managers tenure. One
natural interpretation is the managers reputation. Stein uses this formulation rather than
seemingly more natural performance-related pay, since perfect competition for funds would
reduce the managers pay to his reservation wage. Private benets are inalienable and so
are not competed away. Appendix A shows that the results of this paper continue to hold if
private benets are replaced by performance-related pay.
35The cost of  is borne even if managers are voluntarily revealing as much information as possible: outside
investors have to bear the costs of meeting with the management, processing and analyzing the information,
and investigating if there is additional relevant information that they have not disclosed. This is similar to how
fundamental and technical security analysis is costly, even though much of the information is freely available.
36This formulation assumes that the success of monitoring e¤orts depend on the rms availability of in-
formation: hence, if multiple investors monitor, with probability  all of them obtain information, else none
become informed. The results remain the same if we assume the success depends on the luckof each mon-
itor and thus, if multiple investors monitor, in expectation % of them obtain information and the others do
not. In both cases, debt must be su¢ ciently high so that it is individually rational for an investor to gather
information, else no investor would become informed. The later analysis in Section 3:4 considers the case
where investors can co-ordinate to share the monitoring costs.
37While shareholders and creditorsinterests may conict, the interests of shareholders and the board are
aligned (albeit imperfectly). Thus I assume that the board believes a shareholders claim to have received
positive soft information and thus does not re the manager. Introducing frictions in shareholderscom-
munication with the board will strengthen my results, by providing fewer incentives to monitoring in the
STU.
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The returns per dollar invested are given in the table below (cash C, private benets B).38
The gures given are cumulative, not incremental: for example, an manager pursuing ST
generates cash of J at t = 2 and an extra RST   J at t = 3 if allowed to continue, giving a
total cash position of RST .
Table X: Payo¤s to Investment Strategies
Uninspired Inspired, ST Inspired, LT
Continue until t = 3 K; Tz RST ; T z RLT ; T z(1 + )
Fire at t = 2 L; z J; z r; z: r = L with probability ; J w.p. 1  
The manager is assumed to be essential to the project in which he has invested. Therefore,
shareholders can recover L rather than K by ring an uninspired manager early. However, if
the manager has invested in LT and is red, they only recover L notRLT . I assumeK < L < 1:
the uninspired manager loses money slowly but surely. Moreover, L + z > K + Tz so early
ring maximizes total surplus. RLT > RST > J > 1: LT is better than ST if the manager is
not red, else ST is better. T > 1 denotes that the manager prefers not to be red.  > 0
ensures incentive alignment: the manager prefers LT to ST if he is sure he will not be red,
as investors would like him to.
The remainder of this section compares the investor and manager returns generated by
the three available structures.
3.3.1 Unlevered Firms, Short-Term Contracts
The advantage of short-term contracts is that they allow a poorly performing manager to be
red. However, the benet of allowing liquidation comes at the expense of deterring inspired
managers from pursuing LT . Throughout this paper, I make the following assumptions:
1  
1   + K +

1   + R
LT < L; (29)
1


1   + x(R
LT   L) < 1

; (30)
Tz > z + (1  )Tz(1 + ): (31)
Equation (29) means that, in the absence of information, shareholders prefer to re a
manager upon observing C2 = L  even if all inspired managers always choose LT and
there is thus a 
1 + probability that poor performance results from LT rather than an
uninspired manager. Equation (30) means that a shareholder will choose not to acquire
38Throughout this paper, subscripts will refer to the time period. For example, C2 refers to the rms cash
in period 2.
78
information upon poor performance: the potential gains from continuation if the manager
turns out to be inspired are insu¢ cient to outweigh the cost of obtaining information. As will
be demonstrated, this stems from the investors share of equity being too low. Equation (31)
means that an inspired manager will choose ST if he knows that shareholders wish him to be
red if C2 = L. In this eventuality, the board res him with probability .
Lemma 2 If all managers establish STUs, the unique Nash equilibrium is given as follows:
(i) All inspired managers choose ST;
(ii) If C2 = L, shareholders do not monitor and managers are red with probability .
Part (i) stems from equation (31). Since all inspired managers choose ST , C2 = L au-
tomatically reveals the manager as being uninspired and therefore it is rational to re him
without gathering additional information. There is no alternative Nash equilibrium where
inspired managers always choose LT or play a mixed strategy: equations (29) and (30) mean
that shareholders prefer the manager to be red rather than investing in information.
The expected per dollar return to an investor and manager are given by
RST + (1  ) (L+ (1  )K) ; (32)
and
Tz + (1  )(z + (1  )Tz): (33)
From the shareholdersperspective, there are two problems with this nancing structure.
First, the managers employment continues by default and it requires an active decision from
the board to re the manager. Since the board only res with probability , uninspired
managers are sometimes allowed to continue with the rm. Second, the risk of ring deters
inspired managers from choosing LT and thus shareholders only earn RST if the manager is
inspired. Managerial myopia is frequently attributed to rms being publicly traded and thus
facing pressures to maximize the stock price. However, underinvestment occurs regardless
of whether the STU is private or public. The essence of the underinvestment issue is not
being publicly traded, but shareholders having insu¢ cient incentives to investigate the rms
fundamental value. This leads to ring decisions being taken on the basis of short-term
earnings. Even though these decisions are ex post rational (it is optimal to re a manager
upon C2 = L), they lead to underinvestment ex ante. Taking the rm private but maintaining
dispersed ownership will not solve the issue.
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3.3.2 Unlevered Firms, Long-Term Contracts
A solution to underinvestment is to give the manager a long-term contract which guarantees
his job until t = 3, so that he is unconcerned by short-term performance. Again, this can
occur regardless of whether the rm is public or private. An inspired manager will therefore
choose LT . However, this comes at the expense of prohibiting potentially desirable liquidation
upon poor performance. Per dollar invested, a shareholder receives
RLT + (1  )K; (34)
and the manager has an expected per dollar return of
Tz(1 + ) + (1  )Tz: (35)
3.3.3 Levered Firms
Each rm is now partially nanced by debt with face value f and current value d, and equity
of y   d. Let D = d=y and F = f=y refer to the value of debt per dollar of the rms assets.
Hence capital letters (D;F;RLT ; RST ; K; L) refer to per dollar values, small letters (d; f; x; y)
refer to values for the overall rm or for an investors overall stake. The debt matures at
t = 3, but is protected by a covenant which gives the creditors control at t = 2 if debt is
worth less than or equal to par.39 F  L is required so that control shifts upon interim losses;
tighter bounds will be derived later.
If the t = 2 per-dollar asset value is L, creditors have control. The posterior probability
that the manager is inspired is 
1 + and so creditors will liquidate the rm (in the absence
of any further information) if
1  
1   + K +

1   + F < L: (36)
This is the control-shift e¤ect of debt. Since an underperforming rm is bankrupt at
t = 2, the default decision now switches to liquidation, which occurs with probability 1 in the
absence of information. A particular creditor will choose not to become informed if40
39As is standard in the literature (e.g. Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont and Tirole (1994)),
control rights allow the creditor to take decisions but not put the rm into bankruptcy, force out the equity-
holders and then continue the rm as the aggregate claimant. I assume that if debt is worth exactly par at
t = 2, creditors obtain control. In addition, if a creditor is indi¤erent between continuation and liquidation,
she chooses to continue. This is merely to economize on notation, avoiding the need to write plus epsilon
throughout the document.
40This condition assumes collective action problems among creditors in coordinating to acquire information.
This is consistent since a later condition will assume collective action problems among shareholders.
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1

1   + 
x
D
(F   L) < 1

: (37)
As in Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), the concavity of the creditors claim leads to her
taking conservative actions. By contrast, P has stronger incentives to become informed given
her convex claim: her incentives are a function of (RLT   F ) rather than (F   L). If P
obtains information that the t = 3 payo¤ will be RLT and reveals this to creditors, they will
continue if F  L. For simplicity, I assume that creditors receive the full face value of F under
continuation of an inspired manager, and that the market value of debt is priced so that its
expected return is zero. These do not a¤ect the results, as all returns will be stated on an
overall investor basis, and thus are robust to the distribution of gains between shareholders
and creditors.
Ps payo¤ is zero if creditors liquidate, but under continuation with an inspired manager
it is
x
y
y   d(R
LT   F ): (38)
Lemma 3 An investor in a LEV will choose to become informed if
a =
1


1   + x
y
y   d

RLT   F  > 1

: (39)
The market value of debt is given by
d = (   (1  ))f + (1   + (1  ))Ly: (40)
Substituting both F = f=y and (40) into (39) gives the lower bound to f , fL. Increasing
f has two conicting e¤ects on Ps incentives to obtain information. On the one hand, $x
becomes a higher proportion of the rms total equity. This is denoted the concentration
e¤ect and illustrated by y
y d > 1. This echoes Jensen and Meckling (1976), where debt
concentrates a managers equity holding, directly providing incentives to exert costly e¤ort.
In the present paper, leverage magnies an outside shareholders stake, leading to monitoring.
This indirectly incentivizes managers to undertake long-term projects. On the other hand,
as debt becomes risky, creditors obtain some of the benets from continuation which is the
Myers (1977) debt overhange¤ect. The marginal e¤ect of increasing f on Ps incentives to
gather information is given by
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@a
@f
=
1


1   + x

y(RLT   F ) (   (1  ))  (y   d)
(y   d)2

: (41)
which is positive, as proven in the Appendix. Thus the concentration e¤ect outweighs the
debt overhang e¤ect.
The signaling and contingent control literatures exclusively employ the control shifting
feature of debt. Therefore, borderline risky debt is optimal: debt should be just su¢ cient to
achieve the control shift. In this paper, risky debt is optimal to maximize the concentration
e¤ect. However, debt cannot be too risky, otherwise creditorsclaims are su¢ ciently convex
that they continue the rm even without information, and thus fail to liquidate an uninspired
manager. Since the absence of good news can stem either from failed monitoring or the
equityholders uncovering bad news but choosing not to disclose it, the probability that the
manager is inspired if no information is received is
 =

1 + [1  ]
1  + 1 
1 +
: (42)
Hence the upper bound to f is given by
f  fU = L  (1  )K

y; (43)
where d is as given by equation (40). For the rest of this paper, I assume that fL  f  fU .
As is standard in the literature (see, e.g., Bolton and von Thadden (1998)), (39) assumes
that multiple Ps cannot coordinate to share the costs of information acquisition and so they
must be borne individually. There is no free-rider issue in the model as it is not a Nash
equilibrium for no-one to be informed: one P can become strictly better o¤ by becoming
informed, and it is su¢ cient for just one P to obtain information for an inspired manager not
to be shut down. This model thus di¤ers from standard free-rider problems (e.g. Grossman
and Hart (1980)) where no agent is pivotal, and so there may be equilibria where all parties
are inactive.
Results are qualitatively unchanged if we assume milder costs of collective action, where
equityholders can coordinate to split the cost , but  is increasing in the number of share-
holders owing to greater coordination costs. The concentration e¤ect continues to exist: debt
facilitates monitoring by reducing the number of agents and thus coordination costs. Share-
holders can now be considered a group which invests y   d and bears total costs of . Since
 is decreasing in f , I write (f) where 0(f)  0 and 00(f)  0: The group of equityholders
will become informed if
ea = 
1   +  y
RLT   F
(f)
>
1

; (44)
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where
@ea
@f
=

1   + 
 (f)  (yRLT   f)0(f)
[(f)]2
: (45)
Owing to concavity of (f), (45) will start o¤ positive but then turn negative. Hence ea
will hit 1

at two points, so the lower and upper bounds to f are given by

1   +  y
RLT   fL
(fL)
  1

=

1   +  y
RLT   fU
(fU)
  1

= 0; (46)
where fU > fL. Unless otherwise stated, I assume full costs of collective action so that an
equityholder will only invest if she nds it individually rational. The algebra is more tractable
than the more general (f) case, and the results are unchanged.
Each rm has y d
x
shareholders each bearing cost , i.e. spending  y d
yx
per dollar. Hence
the return to the overall investor community, per dollar invested, is
(   (1  ))RLT + (1   + (1  ))L  (1   + )y   d
yx
: (47)
The rst coe¢ cient arises since  is the probability of the manager being inspired, and (1 
) is the likelihood that he is inspired but C2 = L and information acquisition attempts fail.
Conversely, (1    + (1   )) is the probability that the manager is liquidated at t = 2
through being uninspired, or C2 = L and no information being acquired. The information
costs of  are borne whenever C2 = L, i.e. with probability (1   + ).
I now compare shareholder returns and managerial private benets with the other possible
equilibria, to illustrate the value created by the levered structure. First I compare LEVs to
LTUs. Comparing (47) to (34), the per dollar investor return is higher under a LTU by
(1  )(L K)  (1  )(RLT   L)  (1   + )y   d
yx
: (48)
The rst term represents the savings from optimal liquidation of uninspired managers. The
second term is the loss from ine¢ cient liquidation of inspired managers, if monitoring does
not succeed, and the third term represents monitoring costs.
The expected per dollar return to a manager is
(   (1  ))Tz(1 + ) + (1   + (1  ))z (49)
The per-dollar managerial surplus is lower than under a LTU (see equation (35)) since some
managers are now liquidated. Overall, total surplus (returns to all investors and managers)
is greater than under an all-LTU equilibrium if (L K) (the gains from optimal liquidation
of an uninspired manager) are su¢ ciently high, T and  (the managers private benets) are
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low, the e¤ectiveness of monitoring  is high and the cost of monitoring  is low. A su¢ cient
condition is:
(1  )(L K)  (1  )(RLT   L)  (1   + )y   d
yx
(50)
> (1  )(Tz(1 + )  z) + (1  )(Tz   z):
Now comparing a levered rm to an STU, the manager is unambiguously better o¤ in a
levered rm ((49) exceeds (33)), given his ability to undertake LT . Investors are better o¤ if
( (1 ))(RLT RST )+(1 )(1 )(L K) > (1 )(RST L) (1 +)y   d
yx
:
(51)
The rst term represents the value gains in an all-LEV equilibrium from choosing LT if the
manager is inspired and allowed to continue if C2 = L. The second term represents the gains
from optimal liquidation of an uninspired manager, since the board only res with probability
. The third term is the loss resulting from C2 = L and monitoring attempts failing; the fourth
is the cost of information. (51) will hold if RLT is su¢ ciently higher than RST ,  is high, 
is low and (L  K) is high, in which case the all-LEV equilibrium is Pareto superior to the
all-STU equilibrium.
The two problems with the STU are the boards occasional failure to liquidate an unin-
spired manager, and the inspired managers unwillingness to pursue LT . The levered rms
greater returns stem from addressing both of these issues: achieving optimal liquidation with-
out inducing myopia. This in turn results from the two roles of debt.
The control-shift e¤ect allows the manager to be liquidated upon poor short-term per-
formance. Debt changes the default decision to ring, thus leading to the liquidation of all
underperforming managers in the absence of information. However, debt is not the only
possible method of achieving a control shift. An alternative method would be to keep the
rm unlevered but impose mandatory dividends: force the manager to pay a dividend in
excess of L at t = 2, and re him if the payment is not made (similar to Myers (2000)). By
changing the default decision upon poor performance to ring, such a structure also earns
the (1  )(1  )(L K) term in equation (51). Indeed, in many corporate nance models,
mandatory dividends and debt are interchangeable, as total payout is the key variable. This
is particularly the case since dividends decreases are punished by a strongly negative market
reaction, and so raising the dividend is a credible commitment to maintaining higher payouts
in the future, similar to increasing leverage. The interchangeability is true both for signaling
and overinvestment models. Ross (1977) shows how debt can signal high quality since bad
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rms are unable to meet the debt repayments, but dividends can have the same e¤ect (Bhat-
tacharya (1979)). Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) demonstrate how debt can force managers
to pay out cash rather than overinvesting, but mandatory dividends would also be feasible.
However, in this model, ensuring optimal liquidation is not the only issue. Dividends
are not a satisfactory substitute for debt because they do not solve the second problem of
short-termism. Only debt leads to the concentration e¤ect, which incentivize equityholders
to gather information about the rms fundamental value, thus addressing the root cause of
myopia: decisions being taken on the basis of current earnings.41
In Gümbel and White (2005), debt also elicits information gathering but exclusively
through a control shift, rather than concentration.42 In their model, (29) is reversed and
so shareholders prefer to continue a rm with poor interim performance in the absence of
information. The purpose of monitoring is to nd out if the rm should be liquidated, thus
saving (L  K). With leverage, control now shifts to a creditor whose default decision is to
close the rm. The purpose of monitoring is now to nd out if the rm should be continued,
thus earning the shareholder (RLT  F ) compared to zero if it is liquidated. Since (RLT  F )
may be much greater than (L K), a levered shareholder may have incentives to monitor.
In this model, a control shift from shareholders to creditors has little e¤ect, as shareholders
prefer liquidation anyway, owing to (29). Indeed, if  = 1, there would be no control shift.
Instead, debt works predominantly through the concentration e¤ect, which does not feature
in Gümbel and White (2005) as there is a single shareholder. In their model, borderline risky
debt is optimal: debt has to be large enough so that control shifts if C2 = L, but increasing
F above L merely leads to debt overhang. In this paper, increasing F (so that debt is strictly
risky) is benecial as it leads to greater concentration. This is consistent with the risky debt
seen in private equity portfolio companies.
The results of this subsection are summarized in Proposition 7 below:
Proposition 7 An all-LEV equilibrium leads to higher shareholder returns than an all-LTU
equilibrium. Total surplus is higher if (50) is satised. An all-LEV equilibrium leads to higher
managerial surplus than an all-STU equilibrium. Returns to investors are higher if (51) is
satised.
41Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) identify a second reason why debt may be preferred to a dividend schedule.
Under certain parameter values, equityholders will not discipline the manager if he fails to pay dividends as
they have a convex claim; therefore, it is necessary to shift control to the creditor. In this paper, as in Myers
(2000), uninformed shareholders will wish to re the manager upon poor performance, which is the essence of
the myopia issue.
42In this paper, when an LTU becomes levered, control shifts from the manager to creditors. In Gümbel
and White, the control shift is di¤erent as it is from shareholders to creditors. Control rights never rest with
the manager in their paper.
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3.4 Separating Equilibrium With Heterogeneous Types
The above section suggests that the optimal corporate structure is a LEV. However, in real-
ity, a large proportion of companies are publicly traded with dispersed ownership and little
bankruptcy risk, and private equity-nanced rms are relatively rare. This section intro-
duces heterogeneous manager and investor types, and shows the sustainability of a separating
equilibrium which closely approximates reality.
There now exists two types of managers. There are nB bad managers (type B) which have
a probability pB of becoming inspired. In addition, there are nG good managers (type G) with
probability pG > pB of becoming inspired. The managers type is private information. The
ex ante probability that a manager is good is q = nG=(nB + nG), and the ex ante probability
that a manager is inspired is  = qpG + (1  q)pB. There are nP professional investors (type
P ) each with $x > $1 to invest, which act in the same way as the investors considered thus
far (providing either equity or debt).43 In real life, they correspond to institutions such as
private equity funds and university endowments, which have the time, expertise and incentive
to closely monitor the companies they invest in. In addition, there are nH > nP households
which each have $1 of equity to invest. It can easily be shown that they do not monitor, given
their small stakes.
The previous analyses can be interpreted as comparing three pooling equilibria. The
separating equilibrium analyzed here involves bad managers establishing STUs and being
held by households, and good managers establishing LEVs and being held by professional
investors. This can be interpreted in two ways. First, taken literally, the equilibrium applies
to entrepreneurs seeking nancing for the rst time: the highest quality ones choose greater
leverage. Second, it can be applied to a situation where all rms are currently publicly traded,
and only the good managers choose to seek private equity nancing.
LEVs run the risk of being held entirely by type H and being liquidated upon interim
losses. They therefore impose minimum investment requirements (MIRs) in excess of $1.
In reality, minimum investments of several million dollars are typically needed to acquire
an equity stake in a private rm. As well as being in Gs interest, MIRs also benet type
P , as households can no longer free-ride on their monitoring activity. For instance, in the
model variant where shareholders can coordinate to split the monitoring costs, MIRs maximize
the number of P s in each fund, thus minimizing their individual monitoring expenses. Bad
managers may also benet from MIRs: since households can no longer hold LEVs, type B now
has a captive investor base if they set up STUs, despite being revealed to be of low quality.
43Results are unchanged if types P andH invest only equity, and debt nance is achieved from a third source.
This alternative assumption was made in a previous draft of the paper. The concentration e¤ect is replaced
by a magnication e¤ect. Debt induces monitoring since total rm size rises. Therefore, shareholders are
now the residual claimants of a greater total value of assets, which increases incentives. All the results of the
paper go through: for example, yy d > 1 is replaced by
y+d
y > 1.
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In turn, this ensures that LEVs are run only by good managers, which further benets P .
In the analysis of Section 3:3, control shifting and concentration together led to LEV
being the most e¢ cient structure. Here, the same two features allow a separating equilibrium
to be feasible: control shifting means that debt is a credible signal of managerial quality,
and concentration renders it a desirable signal which good managers are willing to emit.
First,  < 1 means that an uninspired STU manager is only occasionally red, whereas an
uninspired LEV manager is denitely shut down. Thus debt leads to a partial control shift.
This di¤erence makes STUs particularly attractive to bad managers, as they are relatively
likely to produce C2 = L, and so establishing a LEV can credibly signal managerial quality.
Second, good managers desire to give the signal even if it does not lead to higher initial funds.
Being revealed good attracts professional investors who monitor, thus allowing the manager
to undertake LT if he becomes inspired. This makes LEVs particularly attractive to good
managers, as they are likelier to be inspired. Hence neither type of manager wishes to deviate.
I now demonstrate this mathematically. Assume that the myopia problem exists even with
a good manager, as there is a su¢ cient probability that he turns out uninspired, i.e.
1  pG
1  pG + pGK +
pG
1  pG + pGR
LT < L: (52)
If this is not satised, the problem is uninteresting as signaling high quality automatically
solves the myopia issue.
Under a separating equilibrium, each G has xnP
nG
< y of assets, of which xnP dnG
nG
is equity
and the remainder is debt. There are xnP dnG
xnG
equityholders who each bear cost , and so
the average cost per dollar of assets is  xnP dnG
x2nP
. Hence the expected return to a P investor
(pooling across debt and equity) is:
(pG   pG(1  ))RLT + (1  pG + pG(1  ))L  (1  pG + pG)xnP   dnG
x2nP
: (53)
Each B receives nH
nB
< y of assets. Since they choose ST if they become inspired, the expected
per dollar return to a household investor is
pBR
ST + (1  pB) (L+ (1  )K) : (54)
This return is less than (53) since (47) > (34) and pG > . Hence P will choose to hold
entirely LEVs. However, households do not meet the minimum investment requirements to
hold LEVs and so only hold STUs despite the lower returns (which may exceed 1 so investing
in STUs need not be irrational). Comparing (53) with (??), P is strictly better o¤ than under
a LEV pooling equilibrium, as she invests exclusively with good managers. H is strictly worse
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o¤ for three reasons: she invests exclusively with bad managers; such managers pursue ST
rather than LT if they become inspired; and uninspired managers are only liquidated with
probability .44
The per-dollar return to the overall investor community is

(pG   pG(1  ))RLT + (1  pG + pG(1  ))L  (1  pG + pG)xnP   dnG
x2nP

xnP
xnP + nH
+

pBR
ST + (1  pB) (L+ (1  )K)
 nH
xnP + nH
: (55)
The total returns to good LEV managers and bad STU managers are respectively given by
[(pG   pG(1  ))Tz(1 + ) + (1  pG + pG(1  ))z] xnP
nG
(56)
and
[pBTz + (1  pB)(z + (1  )Tz)]nH
nB
: (57)
Proposition 8 Consider a separating equilibrium where good managers establish LEVs, im-
pose a MIR in excess of $1 and engage in LT if they become inspired; bad managers establish
STUs, impose no MIR and engage in ST if they become inspired. Such an equilibrium is
sustainable if the following two conditions are satised:
[(pG   pG(1  ))Tz(1 + ) + (1  pG + pG(1  ))z]xnP
nG
> [pGTz + (1  pG)(z + (1  )Tz)]nH
nB
; (58)
and
[(pB   pB(1  ))Tz(1 + ) + (1  pB + pB(1  ))z]xnP
nG
< [pBTz + (1  pB)(z + (1  )Tz)]nH
nB
: (59)
44In the context of this model, where there is only one managerial decision, mandatory dividends would
solve the fourth problem (but not the rst three) by ensuring all uninspired managers are red. In a more
general model, uncertainty may a¤ect ST and lead to underperformance even if the bad manager turns out
inspired and chooses the safe project. Thus mandatory dividends would be undesirable; in practice, CEOs of
public companies are not automatically red upon poor performance. Therefore this paper instead features
occasional ring by the board.
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The rst (second) condition ensures that G (B) does not deviate. It is possible for both
inequalities to be satised if pG is su¢ ciently greater than pB. Gs desire to be revealed good
does not require xnP
nG
> nH
nB
: separation can be sustained even if being revealed good leads
to fewer initial funds. This result is in contrast to existing signaling models. Instead, the
rewardcomes in the type of investors attracted invested: ones that are able to monitor and
bale out managers whose strategies su¤er interim turbulence.
This di¤erence further leads to dynamic consistency of leverage in this paper. Zwiebel
(1996) notes that some theories of debt are setup models, where it is only individually
rational for the manager to choose debt nancing when the rm is initially set up. The
manager would prefer not to raise debt nancing, since it forces him to pay out cash ows
that he would rather invest in pet projects. He will voluntarily adopt leverage when raising
funds for the rst time, to commit not to overinvest or to signal high quality. However, once
funds have been raised, the manager has incentives to delever to allow him to pursue his pet
projects and so the initial choice of debt nancing is dynamically inconsistent. This problem
arises because debts only role is to act as a signal / commitment device, and signaling is only
useful in the rst period. Zwiebel solves this issue by introducing a raider who is present in
every period, and so it is individually rational for the manager to signal in every period.
In this paper, dynamic consistency is instead achieved because debt has two roles. The
control shift e¤ect credibly signals high quality, but this signal is only relevant in the rst
period, when funds are raised. The concentration e¤ect gives the manager an ongoing incen-
tive to maintain high leverage. Delevering would reduce shareholdersincentives to acquire
information. Indeed, if xnP
nG
< nH
nB
, the only benet of signaling is the type of funds raised, and
the manager can only benet from being nanced by professional investors if he maintains
leverage to give them incentives to monitor. In many agency models, the manager dislikes
monitors since they discipline the manager and force him to exert e¤ort or forgo private ben-
ets. In this model, the monitor is an ally of the manager, providing a dynamically consistent
reason for the manager to retain the monitor through leverage.
The surplus and welfare analysis depends on which pooling equilibrium is the alternative to
the separating equilibrium. Since private equity is a reasonably recent phenomenon, history is
most similar to an all-STU pooling equilibrium. Good managers have an incentive to initiate
the move to a separating equilibrium by setting up LEVs with MIRs. P also benets, but
B and H are worse o¤. Overall, total surplus can rise since long-term projects are now
undertaken. Unlike previous signaling models, we do not require the good time to receive
more funds for total surplus to rise.
Although the previous comparison more closely reects history, I now compare the sep-
arating equilibrium with an all-LEV pooling equilibrium for completeness. Comparing (56)
with (49), G is better o¤ only if he receives more funds. G does not benet from improved
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project choice, since he can choose LT under the all-LEV pooling equilibrium anyway. In-
terestingly, B now may receive higher returns, since he is now only partially liquidated upon
poor performance. Comparing (55) with (47), total investor returns rise only if xnP
nG
> nH
nB
, i.e.
G receives more funds.45
3.5 Discussion
The primary application of the core model is to explain the high leverage in private equity: the
combination of control shifting and concentration allows debt to achieve optimal liquidation
and screen out bad managers without inducing myopia. This benet of leverage is intended to
be complementary to existing justications for the debt-nancing of buyouts, rather than an
exclusive alternative. One oft-cited justication for leverage is to allow the PE fund to achieve
double-digit returns, but this has no e¤ect in a Modigliani-Miller world: PE investorshigh
expected returns are no more than fair compensation for greater nancial risk. A second cited
reason is that debt forces the manager to work hard to avoid bankruptcy (Jensen (1989)).
However, as argued previously, this may be achievable by equity-nancing acquisitions and
threatening to re the manager if he does not pay dividends according to a strict schedule.
Third, Axelson, Stromberg and Weisbach (2005) provide an alternative story for why buyouts
are leveraged and why PE rms sometimes raise capital on a deal by deal basis, based on
agency problems rather than uncertainty about managerial ability. This paper o¤ers an
explanation for these phenomena even when agency issues are small, which is likely to be the
case if investors are concentrated and sophisticated.
The model has a number of additional extensions outside of private equity. In these
applications, either control shifting or concentration may be su¢ cient to add value; in such
cases, mechanisms other than debt can be used to achieve the desired e¤ect. This section
considers these extensions.
3.5.1 Hedge Funds
With few changes, the model can be extended to analyzing the capital structure of investment
companies, the focus of Stein (2005). The two fund types analyzed by Stein have natural
analogies in this model. The closed-end fund is very similar to the LTU, which allows long-
term investment but not liquidation. The open-end fund is analogous to the STU: similar
to short-term contracts or mandatory dividends, open-ending achieves a control shift that
45Even if total investor returns are lower under separation, the industry may move away from an all-LEV
pooling equilibrium since P has a strong incentive to change the equilibrium: under a separating equilibrium,
she invests only with G and thus earns higher returns. Professional investors may achieve a shift by o¤ering
part of their gains to persuade good managers to establish MIRs. As described earlier, B switches to STUs and
receives the currently uninvested household funds. In turn, this ensures that LEVs (and thus Ps investments)
are only run by G.
90
allows liquidation (through permitting investor withdrawals), but at the expense of deterring
long-term arbitrage trades since it has no concentration e¤ect. The LEV structure is not
considered by Stein (2005) and is the principal contribution of this paper. The analogy in
the investment world is hedge funds, which are both closed-ended and levered.46 Leverage
allows hedge funds to undertake risky arbitrage trades, while at the same time deterring bad
managers from establishing such funds as they will likely be liquidated.
3.5.2 Blockholders in Public Corporations
In the core model, the rm is su¢ ciently levered that control shifts to creditors upon poor
interim performance. Shareholdersinformation helps the manager by persuading creditors
not to close down the rm. However, even if debt is insu¢ cient to lead to a control shift, it can
still encourage shareholder monitoring by creating blockholders via the concentration e¤ect.
Edmans (2007a) analyzes how blockholders have strong incentives to gather information about
the rms fundamental value. Informed shareholders do not help the manager by staving o¤
liquidation, since there is no such threat in the rst place. Instead, their support comes
through their trading decisions. If earnings are low, but total order ow is su¢ ciently high
that it is unlikely that the blockholder has sold, the market maker infers that she has uncovered
favorable private information and the negative price impact of interim losses is signicantly
lessened. Since the manager cares about the current stock price (the underlying cause of
myopia), monitoring encourages him to select long-term projects ex ante.
As in the core model, the manager has ongoing incentives to maintain the blockholder.
One purpose of debt-equity buybacks may therefore be to create a concentrated shareholder
who acts as an allyof the manager when earnings are depressed.
3.5.3 Venture Capital
A third extension is to the relationship between venture capital (VC) funds and their port-
folio companies. The latter are very rarely nanced with debt owing to limited debt capacity.
Instead, round nancing creates the control shift and thus potential for liquidation that debt
provides. While the central model illustrates the benets of debt nancing, this sub-section
shows an advantage of round nancing. Whereas the previous application considered concen-
tration with no control shift, this subsection considers control shift without a concentration
e¤ect.
Since round nancing does not lead to concentration, I can simplify by allowing a single VC
fund to be able to nance the entire equity. One feature of VC-nanced companies is that the
46Although investors in hedge funds have some withdrawal rights, Stein (2005) notes that most hedge
funds put some restrictions on withdrawals. He classies them as a half-way house between an open-end and
a closed-end fund. This papers results only rely on limited withdrawal rights for equity investors.
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liquidation value from early termination is very small, and so I assume that the termination
payo¤ is L regardless of rm quality, where L is very low. A second is that interim nancial
performance is relatively meaningless, given the long-term nature of investments, and it is
nearly never the case that VC investors automatically roll over nancing on the basis of
short-term earnings. I therefore no longer incorporate the release of a nancial performance
measure at t = 2.47
There are two main nancing options. One is for the VC fund to invest all of its funds at
t = 1, as in the core model. Under pooling, the investor will continue automatically at t = 2
if
RLT + (1  )K > L: (60)
The VC investor will not gather information if
(L K)y < 

: (61)
Both of these inequalities are satised if L is small: there is little to be gained from early
liquidation. Since there is no interim shut-down, both good and bad managers will seek VC
nancing, and the investor will earn a per dollar surplus of
RLT + (1  )K   1: (62)
The alternative nancing option is for the VC to invest only $vy at t = 1, and the remaining
$(1   v)y at t = 2 if it chooses to continue the rm. v > L else the investor would be able
to make money for certain by initially investing v per dollar and liquidating for L. To deter
bad managers, the default decision in the absence of information is termination. Per dollar,
continuation costs an additional investment of 1   v, plus the L foregone from termination.
Hence, v must be low enough such that
1  v + L > pGRLT + (1  pG)K: (63)
The equity investor will gather information if
47If the interim performance measure is instead retained, it would lead to similar results to the main paper.
The analysis in the text thus focuses on the case with no interim performance, as this is more di¤erent from
the core model. If the company generates strong interim performance, it will be able to obtain nancing
at t = 2 with little di¢ culty as the market will know it is high quality. If interim cash generation is low,
the company will ask the VC for additional funds as no outside investor will nance it. The VC can then
investigate whether the poor nancial performance is due to incompetence or sound investment which has not
yet paid o¤ (e.g. biotechnology R&D is close to producing a commercializable drug) and thus decide whether
to inject additional nancing. Long-term investments are particularly important for VC-backed companies,
which may partly explain the staged nancing (and consequent intensive information gathering) that is a
feature of this industry.
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pG(R
LT   (1  v + L))y > 

; (64)
and earn a per-dollar surplus of
pG(R
LT   1) + (1  pG)(L  v)  
y
: (65)
This surplus is higher than under (62) if pG is su¢ ciently greater than , i.e. there is
su¢ cient uncertainty about manager quality. This variant of the core model di¤ers from
standard signaling models in a subtle way. In Ross (1977), an unlevered rm cannot go
bankrupt even if interim performance is poor: without leverage, there is simply no option to
terminate. Here, the option to obtain information and shut down a bad manager is present
under both nancing structures, but is not exercised under the rst scenario - the default
decision is to continue the rm, and the gains from early shut-down are only L   K. The
role of the nancing round is to change the default decision to termination, and the gains
from monitoring depend on RLT  L which are su¢ cient to encourage information gathering.
In Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Gümbel and White (2005), the commitment to ex
post ine¢ cient monitoring induced by the control shift is desirable to maximize ex ante e¤ort
incentives. In this model, there is no e¤ort decision, but the role of the nancing rounds is to
screen out bad managers.
Finally, the absence of publicly available nancial performance at t = 2 means that auto-
matic monitoring occurs at t = 2. The core model featured contingent monitoring, which only
occurs under short-term losses. The interim performance measure thus reduces monitoring
costs, at a cost of potentially deterring long-term trades if managers are focused upon securing
good t = 2 performance. This comparison may shed light on the debate over mandatory re-
porting requirements. An advantage of greater nancial disclosure is reduced cost to investors
of obtaining information: in many states of nature, the freely available information is su¢ -
cient. On the downside, the information that can be disclosed is incomplete, as only tangible
information can be accurately reported. Forcing companies to disclose tangible performance
measures can distort investment incentives towards projects which will boost such measures.
This issue is explored further in Edmans (2007b).
3.5.4 Empirical Predictions
The equilibrium in Section 3, has a number of predictions that are consistent with empirical
facts. First, private equity portfolio companies are indeed nanced by a substantial amount
of debt. This contrasts with models of total payout, which would suggest that mandatory
dividends would be an adequate substitute, and control shiftmodels which would advocate
borderline risky debt.
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Second, the separating equilibrium suggests that levered structures should outperform
because they attract high-quality managers and allow them to invest optimally. Ljungqvist
and Richardson (2003) nd that private equity generates excess returns of 5-8% per year
relative to the aggregate public equity market. Even on a risk-adjusted basis, the excess
value of the typical private equity fund is on average 24% of the present value of the invested
capital. Ackermann et al (1999) nd that the average hedge fund consistently outperforms
mutual funds, even after risk and fees are taken into account. The average Sharpe ratio is
21% higher than for comparable mutual funds. The outperformance occurs in nearly every
time horizon, further implying that it is a result of superior managerial ability.
Third, models such as Stulz (1990) and Zwiebel (1996) models predict that leverage con-
strains managers and reduces investment: this can apply to both protable and empire-
building projects. However, this paper suggests that there is an opposing force: debt can
encourage desirable projects which do not pay o¤ until the long-run. Whether this outweighs
the traditional e¤ect is an empirical question that has not been tested, to my knowledge.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper addresses a fundamental dilemma in corporate governance: how can investors en-
sure that bad managers are liquidated, without inducing good managers to take suboptimal
actions to avoid liquidation? Mandatory dividends and short-term contracts achieve liquida-
tion at the expense of myopia; long-term contracts allow far-sighted investment but prevent
optimal shut-down.
The model introduces a novel benet of debt that can alleviate this tension: the con-
centration of equityholdersstakes and the consequent elicitation of information gathering.
Monitoring is desirable even in the absence of an e¤ort problem as it allows long-term project
choice. As a result, debt may have signicant advantages other control-shift mechanisms as
a means of achieving optimal liquidation, as it does not su¤er the side-e¤ect of encouraging
myopia. Dividends and debt are not interchangeable substitutes.
In addition, the monitoring induced by leverage allows a separating equilibrium to be
sustainable: good managers are willing to signal quality by assuming debt. Even if such
signaling leads to fewer initial funds, the good manager benets from the ability to undertake
long-term projects. Once the signal has been given and initial nance has been raised, the
manager has continued incentives to maintain leverage and thus a concentrated monitor.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Performance-Related Pay
Stein (2005) aligns managers with investors via private benets, since incentive fees should be
driven to zero under perfect competition. This section shows that the results of the main paper
continue to hold if private benets are replaced by incentive compensation. The manager now
receives a fraction  of the the rms assets in each period. Assuming no discounting for
simplicity, his payo¤ at t = 3 if the rm is not liquidated is proportional to the sum of assets
at t = 2 and t = 3. Table X is now replaced by Table XI below:
Table XI: Payo¤s to Investment Strategies, Incentive Fees
Uninspired Inspired, ST Inspired, LT
t = 3 (1  )K; (K + L) RST ; (RST + J) (1  )RLT ; (RLT + r)
t = 2 (1  )L; L (1  )J; J (1  )r; r: r = L w.p. ; J w.p. 1  
The expected per dollar return to a manager of type i in a LTU and a LEV are respectively
[pi(R
LT + L+ (1  )J) + (1  pi)(K + L)]; (66)
and
[(pi   pi(1  ))(RLT + L+ (1  )J) + (1  pi + pi(1  ))L]; (67)
which replace equations (35) and (49) respectively. A manager of a STU now expects to earn
[pi(R
ST + J) + (1  pi)(z + (1  )Tz)]; (68)
which replaces equation (33). As in the main model, this is less than under a LEV.
The separating equilibrium of Section (3:4) holds if neither G nor B deviate, i.e. the
following two conditions are met:
[(pG   pG(1  ))(RLT + L+ (1  )J) + (1  pG + pG(1  ))L]xnP
nG
> [pG(R
ST + J) + (1  pG)(z + (1  )Tz)]nH
nB
; (69)
and
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[(pB   pB(1  ))(RLT + L+ (1  )J) + (1  pB + pB(1  ))L]xnP
nG
< [pB(R
ST + J) + (1  pB)(z + (1  )Tz)]nH
nB
: (70)
3.7.2 Proofs
Proof that Ps monitoring incentives are increasing in f
The marginal e¤ect of increasing f on Ps incentives to gather information is given by
equation (41) :
@a
@f
=
1


1   + x

y(RLT   F ) (   (1  ))  (y   d)
(y   d)2

:
This is positive if the term in square brackets is positive. Substituting for d using equation
(40) and rearranging, the term in square brackets is positive if
(   (1  ))RLT + (1   + (1  ))L  1 > 0: (71)
The left-hand side is the NPV of investing in a rm with unknown quality which pursues RLT
if the manager is inspired. Since an all-LTU equilibrium exists, it is NPV-positive to nance
such a rm. Hence (71) and thus (41) are positive: the concentration e¤ect outweighs the
debt overhang e¤ect.
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